Ziya Gökalp

Turkification

Islamization

Modernization

BERSERKER
BOOKS

ZİYA GÖKALP

Becoming Turkish, Becoming Muslim, Becoming Modern

Adapted by:
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FROM THE PUBLISHER

Ziya Gökalp is the founder of modern Turkish nationalism.

For this reason, Turkish youth need Ziya Gökalp's works in order to fully grasp and learn about Turkish nationalism.

We are all aware that the great Atatürk, the founder of the Republic, once said, *'If Ali Riza Efendi is THE FATHER of my flesh and blood, then Ziya Gökalp is THE FATHER of my ideas'*, thereby making the ideas of this great thinker his guide.

It is therefore our duty to teach and instil in today's youth these ideas that their forefather took as his guide.

The majority of the articles Ziya Gökalp wrote for newspapers and magazines have been published in book form. Unfortunately, however, the language the author used at the time, whilst simple for the period in which they were written, is not easily comprehensible to today's young people. Some publishers of Gökalp's books still preserve the language he used years ago exactly as it was, whilst others, under the pretence of simplifying it, have turned it into an incomprehensible jumble of made-up words. For this reason, Turkish youth are unable to benefit properly from these works, which are caught between these two extremes.

It is for this reason that I have simplified all of Ziya Gökalp's works into a language that everyone can understand. I believe that in doing so, I have rendered a great service to nationalism and culture. The approach I adopted whilst simplifying the books was to use words that the public knows and uses. Whether the word is of Turkish origin, or has entered our language from Arabic or Persian… I thought that as long as it is a word that everyone uses and understands, that is sufficient.

The aim is to reflect Ziya Gökalp's ideas as faithfully as possible. If I were to give a few examples of what I mean,

I used **‘dil’** instead of **‘lisan’**, **‘atasözü’** instead of **‘darb-ı mesel’**, and ‘soy’ instead of **‘nesil**’. Sometimes, alongside the older word, I provided its meaning in brackets; as in the example of **‘teamül’** ***(custom, tradition)***.

At other times, I have used both ‘mefkûre’ and its equivalent ‘ülkü’, as well as both ‘hars’ and ‘culture’. This is because I wanted these words to be learnt and not discarded.

I followed this approach in the 10 works by Ziya Gökalp that I have simplified. I confidently recommend these works to young Turks.

Yalçın Toker

- I - THREE CURRENTS M

There are three intellectual currents in our country. If the history of these currents is examined, it becomes clear that our thinkers first felt the need **to modernise**(1).

This trend, which began during the reign of **Sultan Selim III** (2), was joined after the Revolution *(the Second Constitutional Era)* by the aspiration **to 'Islamise**'. More recently, however, the **'Turkish nationalism'** movement has emerged.

As the idea of *'modernisation' ( )* is regarded by thinkers as a fundamental principle, it has no distinct proponent . Every journal and every newspaper can be considered, to a greater or lesser extent, an advocate of this idea.

The journals **'Sırat-ı Müstakim'** (3) and **'Sebil-ür Reşat'** (4) are the propagators and advocates of the idea of Islamisation.

The journal that propagated the idea of **'Turkification'** was ***Türk Yurdu***(5). On closer inspection, it becomes clear that all three movements arose from the same need.

Tarde(6) argues that the concept of nationalism began with the newspaper and explains this view as follows:

"The newspaper brings together PEOPLE WHO speak the SAME language to form A 'PEOPLE' and gives them a shared conscience. Apart from this effect, WHİCH İT BRİNGS ABOUT unconsciously, the newspaper is compelled—merely to ensure its circulation—to flatter its readers' FEELİNGS OF pride and patriotism, and to write words THAT REVİVE their national traditions and glorious national MEMORİES."

Once a sense of national identity has been awakened within a people, it spreads easily to neighbouring peoples as well. For as soon as this sense of national identity is awakened, it heightens the feelings of solidarity, self-sacrifice and struggle

thereby paving the way for their progress in the fields of morality, language, literature, economics and politics.

Among neighbouring peoples who observe this situation with envy and admiration – provided they also have newspapers written in their vernacular – the rapid spread of the sense of nationhood will be regarded as a perfectly natural occurrence.

The concept of **nationalism** ***(ideal)*** first emerged among non-Muslims, then among the Albanians and Arabs, and finally among the Turks. It is not without reason that the Turks came last. For the Ottoman Empire had been founded by the Turks.

The state represents an existing nation *(nation de fait)*, **whilst the sense of national identity is the essence of the nation one wishes to create** *(nation de volonté)***.** The Turks, acting with a prudent *and intuitive* foresight, refrained from jeopardising an entity for the sake of an ideal.

For this reason, Turkish thinkers used to say, ***'There is no such thing as "Turkishness", there is only "Ottomanism"'.***

Those aligned with the modernisation movement, whilst propagating the ideas of the Tanzimat, had come to believe that it was possible to create the 'nation **intended to be** established' from the **existing** 'nation'—composed of various elements and sects—and, driven by this belief, had ascribed a new meaning to the long-established term **'Ottoman'**, one entirely distinct from national connotations. Bitter experience showed that no one other than the pro-Tanzimat Turks embraced this new meaning attached to the term 'Ottoman'.

The introduction of this new meaning was not only futile but also gave rise to highly detrimental consequences for the State, **its constituent elements**[7] and, in particular, the Turks.

Both the East and the West of the world clearly demonstrate to us that this century is the century **of nationalism**.

For this reason, the most influential force on the consciences of this century is the ideal **of nationalism**.

A State charged with the administration of the public conscience cannot fulfil its duty if it disregards this important social factor.

If this sentiment is absent amongst statesmen and party leaders, it is impossible to govern the religious communities and

various ethnic groups that constituted the Ottoman Empire.

A four-year experiment has shown us that the Turk, who was forced to say ***'I am not a Turk, I am an Ottoman'*** solely for the sake of uniting the various elements, eventually realised, in a most painful way, what sort of compromise the elements could agree to.

A country where the sense of nationality prevails can only be governed by those who feel the joy of nationality within themselves. The Turks' reluctance to embrace the ideal of nationhood was not only harmful to the state and a source of unease for the various elements, but also a threat to the very existence of Turkishness. Because the Turks perceived nationhood as synonymous with the State—which is the existing nation—they failed to realise that their social and economic existence was in the process of decay. As social and economic dominance passed into the hands of other elements living in the country, the Turks did not even realise that they were losing something. For, in their eyes, there were only the elements that constituted the Ottoman nation. They did not attach any importance to their own exclusion from certain classes—even if these classes constituted the most important social strata of our time.

Considering the existence of the classes that directed the country's economic and technical life— —to be sufficient, they did not regard their own exclusion from these as a threat.

It is precisely because of this trend that, even in Anatolia, there is no longer any sense of 'Turkishness' amongst the common people or the general populace. Turks were found only amongst the classes of *civil servants* and *farmers*[8]. Since the term 'civil servant' in this context refers to *a sensible farmer*, 'Turkishness' came to mean, in a social sense, 'farming'. *Farmers and shepherds*, too, do not themselves constitute a creative force, as they live by utilising the creative power of life. Sheep multiply through nature's own power. Crops sprout through the God-given power hidden within the seeds.

Civil servants, however, have no connection whatsoever with production. Yet the development and evolution of mental abilities, will and character arise from work such as industry and construction, as well as from occupations such as trade and the liberal professions

. For this reason, attempting to establish a state organisation from a nation composed of the peasant and civil servant classes amounts to abolishing power. For the merchant, the artisan and the businessman desire a strong government solely for their own benefit.

In any country where the government relies on the civil service, the government is invariably weak; for civil servants who have been dismissed from their posts seek to return to office, whilst those currently in post strive to advance their careers, and so they constantly endeavour to keep the government in a precarious position and to bring it down.

The absence of a national ideal has not only deprived the Turks of a national economy but has also consistently hindered the simplification of their language and the emergence of national styles in the fine arts. Furthermore, due to the lack of a national ideal, Turkish morality has, until now, remained dependent on the individual and the family. Feelings such as social solidarity, national honour and self-sacrifice have not extended beyond the confines of the family, village and town. As the ideal of the ummah is very broad whilst that of the family is very narrow in scope, the Turkish spirit has remained alien to a strong and vibrant moral outlook that would serve as the foundation for feelings of self-sacrifice and the renunciation of personal interests.

It is precisely this situation that has led to the dissolution of our national institutions in the economic, religious and political spheres.

Far from being the antithesis of Ottomanism, the Turkish nationalist movement is, in fact, its strongest supporter. However, as with any new movement, the Turkish nationalist movement has its extremists—a group of young people—who give rise to certain misinterpretations. In reality, Turkish nationalism is the true foundation of Islam and Ottomanism, standing in opposition to **cosmopolitanism**(9).

Tarde, who explained that the idea of nationalism began with the newspaper, states that the ‘sense of *İNTERNATİONAL unity’* also arises from the ‘book’. As the newspaper appeals to the sentiments of the people, it uses the living vocabulary of the spoken language. The book, on the other hand, addresses the specific ideals of scholars and those engaged in scholarship. For this reason, it relies more on scientific terminology than on the spoken language.

It is a general rule that terms should not be derived from words used in the vernacular. This is because words, just like living and natural entities

. Terms, on the other hand, are *artificial* and inanimate entities.

As the *natural* words of the vernacular carry living and emotional meanings, they do not accept or recognise invented and abstract meanings.

It is for this reason that every nation derives its terms from the language in which the holy book was written. As the European nations found the Holy Bible written in Greek, they also adopted their scientific terms from Greek. Subsequently, as Latin served as an intermediary between Greek and Christianity, many terms passed from Latin into the languages of the Germanic and Slavic peoples.

Islamic nations, on the other hand, generally adopted their terms from Arabic, and some from Persian.

Even today, when translating the scientific knowledge of the entire century into our language, we use Arabic and Persian terms rather than Greek and Latin ones.

In any nation, books on religion are written first. Then, as disciplines such as ethics, law, literature, science and philosophy become independent of religion, books on these subjects begin to be written.

Thus, just as the newspaper depicts the people's social and regional sentiments, coloured by the hues of daily life and emotion (10), so too does the book, by setting out the principles, rules and foundations *of* religion, the cultural branches arising from it, and the sciences—that is, *civilisation*—in an abstract and precise style, foster a shared life amongst nations, that is, the spirit of international unity.

It is a misconception to assume that a sense of international unity existed in all people from the very beginning. For example, in medieval Europe, there was a sense of international unity. However, if we examine this sentiment, we see that international aid and protection in Europe were directed solely towards Christian nations, and international law was used as a tool to secure the privileged rights of Christian states.

The Balkan War demonstrated that the European conscience is, even today, nothing other than a Christian conscience. If one analyses the conscience of the Turks, it becomes apparent that a Turkish girl may be married to an Arab, an Albanian, a Kurd or a Circassian, but she certainly cannot be married to a Finn or a Christian Hungarian. A Buddhist

Mongol or a Tungus of the Shamanist faith, without first converting her to Islam.

It was not the Hungarians, Mongols or Manchus who shared in the Turks' misfortunes during the Tripoli and Balkan Wars.

On the contrary, during those days, Muslim peoples from China, India, Java, Sudan and others whose names we did not even know shared in our suffering and did not withhold their moral support. It is for this reason that, although the Turks belong to the Uralic and Altaic linguistic branches, they consider themselves part of the community of Islamic nations.

According to the science of *anthropology*, people sharing *the* same *anatomical structure (body STRUCTURE)* constitute a race; similarly, according to the science of *sociology*, nations within the same civilisation form an *international (İNTER-NATİONAL)* union.

The **Turkish language**, like the Turkish people, ***became Islamised in terms of its alphabet and terminology*** after entering the sphere of Islamic civilisation**.**

It follows, then, that what constitutes the spirit of international unity is the book and, by extension, civilisation. For this reason, there has never been any conflict between Turkishness and Islam, as one embodies ***'nationality'*** whilst the other embodies ***'international unity***'.

When Turkish thinkers neglected Turkishness and envisaged an inter-religious form of **Ottomanism**, they did not feel the need for **Islamisation**. However, as soon as **the ideal of 'Turkification'** emerged, the need for Islamisation also began to be felt. Furthermore, just as **'nationality'** arose from the 'newspaper' and **'international unity'** from the 'book', so too did **'modernity'** *(modernism)* arise from the 'tool' *(outile)*.

The contemporaries of a given era are those who are able to manufacture and utilise all the tools produced and used by the most advanced nations in the field of *science (technology)* during that era.

For us today, *to become contemporary* means being able to manufacture and use armoured vehicles, motor cars and aeroplanes, just like the Europeans.

Becoming contemporary does not mean resembling Europeans in terms of appearance and way of life. Only when we are freed from the necessity of purchasing

industrial goods from Europe, only then will we realise that we have become modern.

We have stated that there is no conflict between the ideals of **becoming more Turkish** and **becoming more Islamic**. Nor is there any conflict between these and the ideal of modernisation.

The need **to be modern** demands that we adopt from Europe only scientific and practical tools and techniques. We have certain spiritual needs, arising from religion and nationality in Europe, which must also be explored from these sources in our own context; these do not need to be imported from the West in the same way as tools and techniques.

We must therefore accept all three of these needs, whilst defining the boundaries of each one's sphere of influence. More precisely, by recognising that these are three distinct manifestations of a single need, we must create ***a 'Contemporary Islamic Turkish Identity***'.

At the same time, contemporary civilisation—arising from the development of new tools and techniques over a period of time—is giving rise to a new form of international unity based on the positive sciences. In our age, international unions based on religion are giving way to genuine international unions based on science.

Since the accession of Japan on the one hand and Turkey to the European Union on the other has conferred a ***'non-religious'*** character on the European Union, as we shall demonstrate later at , the spirit of international unity is increasingly becoming distinct from the boundaries of the ummah community. In other words, today the Turkish Nation is a people bound to the Ural-Altaic family, the Islamic ummah, and the European Union.

1 **Modernisation:** Becoming contemporary, adapting to the times. Becoming modern.

2 **Sultan Selim III:** The 28th Ottoman Sultan. He was a reformist Sultan. He reigned from 1789 to 1807. Following his establishment of the ***Nizam-ı Cedid***, a modern-style army, he was deposed as a result of the Kabakçı Revolt instigated by the Janissaries.

3 **Sırat-ı Müstakim:** Published by **Eşref** Edib and with **Mehmet** Akif as its chief editor, this was the most influential Islamist journal during the years of the First World War and the War of Independence. The journal's largest readership was found not only in Turkey but also in Turkic countries such as Azerbaijan, Crimea and West Turkestan.

4 **Sebil-ür Reşat:** This journal was published by the editorial team of Sırat-ı Müstakim, which championed the principles of Islamism, with the aim of continuing and perpetuating those ideas; it served as a significant source of moral strength, particularly during our War of Independence.

5 **Türk Yurdu:** A journal first published in 1911 to disseminate the principles of the Türk Ocakları, which were founded with the aims of awakening Turkish national consciousness, promoting the spread and adoption of the idea of Turkish nationalism, and preserving Turkish cultural values ( ). It continues to be published to this day. For many years, the journal Türk Yurdu was edited by **Yusuf Akçura**.

6 **Tarde:** A renowned French sociologist. He is the author of works such as **THE LAWS OF Imitation* and *The Philosophy of Crime**.

7 **Unsur:** The population of the Ottoman Empire was composed of people belonging to various nationalities, speaking different languages , and adhering to different religions and denominations. It had been established as a principle of the State to unite these elements *(subject COMMUNİTİES)* within the framework of Ottoman identity, centred on **national unity**, regardless of whether they were Arab, Persian, Greek, Armenian, Serbian, Bulgarian, Hungarian or Albanian. **(İttihad-ı Anâsır)**

8 **Rençber:** Labourer, worker, peasant. *Renc: HARDSHİP + ber: to endure = one who endures HARDSHİP*, one who does very hard labour.

9 **Cosmopolitan:** Encompassing people of various nationalities. Ottoman society was a cosmopolitan society comprising people from a wide variety of nationalities.

10 **To depict:** To describe in words, as if painting a picture.

- II - LANGUAGE

Just as objects have length, width and height, so too does **the social conscience *(awareness)*** have three dimensions: **Nationalism, Pan-Islamism, Modernity.**

We shall first examine the extent to which this statement is true by looking at language, one of the mirrors reflecting social consciousness.

Our language has been on a path of expansion for the past fifty to sixty years. As the defining innovations of our century reach our country, our eyes continue to see new things and our minds continue to grasp new concepts.

As these concepts cannot remain nameless, new words corresponding to them enter our language every day, thereby enriching it.

We are translating from the newspapers and books of nations that are representative of this century. Consequently, many meanings absent from our cultural and scientific life await the discovery and coining of new words by our intellectuals.

As our language comes into contact with more developed languages, it begins, as it were, to imitate them word for word. Sometimes, as in the case of the words *'hurdebin' (microscope), 'dürbün' (telescope), 'şehkâ'*—that is, *'masterpiece' or 'superior work' (chef-d'œuvre)—and 'mefkûre' (ideal),* the words are copied verbatim. At other times, as seen in words such as 'tayyare' *(*i.e. *aeroplane), 'tekâmül' (evolution), 'meşrutiyet' (constitution) and 'bediiyet' (aesthetics),* the imitation is in terms of meaning.

This trend in our language shows us the following:

A time will come when our Turkish language will possess equivalents for all the words in French, English and German.

Since the name given to an object serves to describe its essence, and since the spoken word also expresses the speaker's spirit,

there is a language that expresses the concepts of our century, to which every language must conform. Given this situation, the Turkish language will have completed its development.

New words entering our language fall into three categories:

1. *FOREİGN words.*
2. *Words formed or borrowed from Arabic or Persian*[11].
3. *Words derived from or Turkified from Turkish.*

Words of the first type enter our language surreptitiously. Our understanding of language requires that these words be removed from our language and replaced with equivalents—from Arabic and Persian if they are *'terms'*, and from Turkish if they are ordinary words.

The practice of deriving equivalents for technical terms from Arabic and Persian, whilst avoiding the adoption of foreign words, is not unique to Turkish. This characteristic is common to the languages of all Islamic countries.

In religious terminology and the terminology of other sciences derived from religion, these languages—which are essentially united—must maintain their unity through new terms as well. For if, for example, the Turks in Russia were to adopt their terms from Russian, the Turks in China from Chinese, and we, the Turks of Turkey, from French, our Turkish language would gradually drift apart from one another. However, if we were all to derive our terms from Arabic, Persian or Turkish—that is, from a single source—we would, on the contrary, grow closer to one another.

Christian nations, on the other hand, have derived their terms from Greek and Latin.

Islamic languages, by adopting these terms verbatim, simultaneously fear losing their own **'ummah'** identity. However, there is no rule stating that Islamic languages, by deriving their terms from Arabic and Persian, are thereby deemed to have fulfilled their duties towards **'ummah** unity'.

If these terms are derived from different roots in each language, the necessary unity will not be achieved, and **'linguistic ummah-ism'** will remain incomplete. For this reason, we must seek out and identify the words that other Islamic languages have adopted or might adopt in order to establish these terms. To ensure this, within the Islamic ummah

, religious associations responsible for coining terms must be established, and these associations must convene **'terminology congresses'** at regular intervals to review the situation.

Once all the terms of the Islamic languages have been harmonised through these congresses, the development of our language in line with the Ummah will be complete; in other words, **the 'Islamisation of the language'** will be deemed to have been achieved.

Once our language possesses a "Dictionary *of Terminology*" serving as the common language of the Islamic ummah, it will move towards avoiding Arabic and Persian. This is because the Arabic and Persian words that have entered Turkish are not technical terms. A great many Arabic and Persian words have entered our language unnecessarily. Indeed, the influence of these two languages on Turkish has not been limited to the mere introduction of words. Arabic and Persian phrases, prepositions and suffixes have also entered Turkish, throwing the rules of the Turkish language into disarray.

It is necessary **to modernise** our language in terms of meaning, **to Islamise it** in terms of terminology, and **to Turkify it** in matters of grammar and spelling.

In Turkish, all words other than technical terms should, where possible, BE İN Turkish or have been Turkified.

Arabic and Persian *phrases, plurals, prepositions and verb conjugations SHOULD BE REMOVED from our language;* instead of saying *'ŞUARA-Yİ cedide'*, we should say **'new poets'**; instead of **'Edebiyat-ı Türkiyye',** we should say **'Turkish Literature'**; **'tâbi'lik'** instead of **'tâbiiyet'**, 'serbestlik' instead of 'serbestî', **'icazcı bir muharrir'** *(an original writer)* instead of 'muciz bir muharrir', and *'İCAZCI, özgün bir söyleyiş'* instead of **'mûciz bir ifâde**'.

However, it is not correct to limit the Turkishisation of language to words alone. If possible, we should also form all scientific terms from Turkish words. But if this is not possible, it is more appropriate for our terms to be derived from Arabic and Persian rather than French or Russian.

Even if not amongst all Muslims, it is essential that terms, just like words, be shared amongst all Turks; in other words, that all Turks have a common literary and scientific language.

We must therefore not forget that, whilst Turkifying our language, we need to move step by step towards a general, common Turkish that all our compatriots can understand.

To summarise our thoughts:

‘New concepts’ pertain to the century, **‘scientific terms’** to the ummah, whilst **‘words’** relate to the nation’s ability to express itself properly.

Turkish cannot be considered a developed—or, more accurately, a complete—language unless it serves as a sensitive mirror that fully reflects these three stages of development in the collective conscience *(awareness)* of society.

11 **Acemce:** Persian, the language of the Iranians.

- III - TRADITION AND RULE

Whichever aspect of our social life we look at, we see two currents clashing:

One of these is **radicalism** *(belonging to the root, changing from the root, radicalism)*, the other is **conservatism** *(stubborn adherence to tradition)*.

These two currents, which are regarded as exact opposites, are in fact united by a common foundation: **rule-bound thinking.**

Conservatives view existing rules as immutable truths and regard any attempt to change them with disdain. *Radicals*, on the other hand, accept rules that are in accordance with reason as immutable laws and accuse those who do not accept them of being reactionary.

Neither of these two groups deems it necessary to investigate where these old or new rules originated, how they developed, or how they came to be adapted to contexts that subsequently became incompatible with one another. This is because, for both sides, the rule is a *'kaim binnefs' (self-existent entity)* independent of time and context *(environment)*. This is not a temporary and contingent stage in the development of a society's way of life, but a rule that is, in essence, fixed and definite—a rule whose beginning and end cannot be predicted, existing in a realm independent of time and context.

As adherence to rules forms a habit through repeated practice, the elderly tend to be conservative. Young people, however, are driven by a desire to emulate the advanced nations whose civilisation they perceive as radiant, attributing the cause of their progress to the correctness of the ' ' rules they practise . For this reason, young people join the ranks of radical revolutionaries.

Whether it is called **custom** *(tradition)*, fashion, etiquette, or protocol; whether it is termed belief or **ijtihad**[12]; whether it appears in the form of **fiqh**[13] provisions or legal statutes, **the rule** is always the same

thing. When development is regarded not as a transient and unstable point of pause, but as something frozen and unchanging, it is seen to take on the form of a lifeless skeleton.

The essence of life is creative development. Entities that have not undergone a process of development are lifeless. The rule-bound confuse the result with the cause, substituting the result for the cause. The rule is a temporary result of development. They mistake this for the cause of development. Since the cause is deemed clear, they no longer see any need to examine the history of development.

Those who hold this view regard the rule as the supreme ruler; consequently, when they see that no benefit can be derived from its application, they place the entire blame on the poor rule.

The radicals, however, immediately raise their voices, forcing the conservatives to fall silent. In such a situation, the course of action is very simple: to do away with the old rules and replace them with new ones. Yet the reign of these new rules does not last long either, for in practice, problems begin to arise once more. This time, too, those who favour tradition raise their heads. They call on the imitators to step aside.

This is precisely how it has always been in our case. If one examines the history of the Turkish nation;

it will be seen that we have experienced many historical periods that bear no resemblance to one another. Our institutions have resembled the treasuries of conquering states—which are suddenly filled with the spoils of victory but, as they do not draw their sustenance from the national economy, are doomed to be emptied just as suddenly. Instead of establishing historical links to transform our new institutions, born of progress, into living traditions, we have cast them aside and we have simply copied and adopted institutions from every country as if they were '*traditions and rules without a history*'.

The British people are a nation without fixed rules. Yet their historical ties and forward-looking, enterprising traditions are a distinctive feature of this nation. It is precisely these traditions that have driven the British people's progress.

We Turks are a rule-bound nation, yet one that is not attached to its traditions. Just as we do not seek out the historical sequence and characteristics of our traditions pertaining to our Turkishness and Islam, we also feel no need to investigate the sources and developments of the advancements that have left their mark on our century. For we require only the results.

After a series of ups and downs, European civilisation—which has left us with a certain residue of **scientific and religious** rules—has, following some of our own revolutions, come to resemble scientific and practical rules.

Some of us make use of those remnants, whilst others plunder those rules. Whether a rule takes root as a habit or through imitation, it lacks the qualities of creativity and progressiveness. For sporadic imitations cannot all coexist at once, nor do they have a past of their own. Rules, each an independent and absolute realm in itself, remain as they are where they stand; they cannot shape a future either.

Tradition, on the other hand, is creative and progressive. For tradition possesses a past that has fused various eras together, and a historical current that propels it forward like a dynamic force from behind. This, in turn, gives rise to constant new developments and new directions.

Whilst tradition is, in itself, productive and creative, the foreign innovations instilled within it also draw nourishment from the lifeblood coursing through its veins and come to life; they do not wither and fall away as they would in a mere act of imitation.

Bergson[14] regards a person's soul as *the 'totality of their memories'* and their body as *the 'totality of their habits*'.

A nation's memories are its traditions. Its habits, on the other hand, are its rules. Thus, a nation's soul is formed by its traditions, and its body by its rules. A nation rooted in its traditions seeks its foundation in its spirit, whilst a rule-bound nation seeks it in its body. The former reveals the meanings of life, the latter its words. The former lives in a historical freedom, the latter in a geographical captivity.

In the clashes we had with the Bulgarians during the Balkan War, they drew their strength and direction from their fiery traditions, whilst we drew ours from our rigid rules. In the end, history triumphed over geography. *(That is to say, traditions triumphed over rules, and the Bulgarians triumphed over the Turks.)*

It follows, then, that both the paths of conservatism and modernisation we have been following up to now are dead ends. Our new way of life must steer clear of both. First and foremost, we must examine

. Turkish literature begins neither with **Aşık Paşa** nor with **Nevaî** ***(Ali Şir Nevaî)***.

We must seek the sources of our literature, on the one hand, in stone inscriptions **(the Orkhon Monuments)** and on gazelle hides, and, on the other hand, in the folk poems and epics of the people.

Our national metre is **the syllabic metre** ***(that is, the hece vezni)***. Our national language is one that adheres solely to Turkish grammar.

Our national literature must draw its themes and sources from Turkish life, the social structure of the Turkish people, Turkish *legends (mythology)* and Turkish tales.

We must eliminate foreign phrases from our language, **foreign metres** ***(such as the aruz metre)*** from our poetry, and foreign artistic styles from our literature. If we trace our language and literature back to the very origins of our tradition, we shall realise that the temporary occupations they endured were merely brief periods of illness.

We must also revive Turkish legal history by bringing to light its 'türe' *(customary law)*, 'yasa' (statutes) and 'tüzük' (regulations).

Whilst Turkish architecture and Turkish painting may be sought in the buildings and works of the *'Umma* era' *(the OTTOMAN period)*, Turkish music, like our national poetry and literature, must be sought only in the oral traditions and collective memory of the people.

Turkishness possesses an ideal whose traces remain in words, proverbs, idioms, fairy tales and epics. Our greatest task is to unearth this ideal from amidst this scattered rubble and to discover the pre-historical national values hidden within it.

Secondly, we must examine in minute detail the traditions and history of our Islamic institutions. We must know the history of Kalām *(the science of God and religion)*, Sufism and Fiqh *(Islamic jurisprudence)*.

Only when we understand how these institutions have developed can the progress they will make in our century and in the future be considered acceptable.

Tradition does not merely establish a connection and harmony between the various forms an institution has taken over time. By demonstrating how all these institutions have arisen from the same root, it links them all together.

According to Durkheim, all institutions—such as morality, law, politics, logic, art and economics—have their origins in religion. By drawing their roots from a religious source, these branches attain a vibrant productivity and a powerful vitality[15].

As tradition is unifying and promotes social harmony, it can fuse the essence of Turkish history with that of religion to create a Turkish-Islamic Philosophy of History.

Thirdly, in order to benefit from the technical knowledge, science, methods and philosophy of the century, we must also investigate their histories of development and how they have adapted to the times and society.

The history of civilisation shows us that when industry begins to develop in a country, the sciences and technologies also develop.

Science *(technology)* arises from industry.

Industry: It deals with matters of administration and management. In our country, the teaching of science is regarded as an end in itself rather than a means to an end. Our scientists know only how to talk about science, but do not know how to apply it. It follows, then, that in our country there is neither science in the true sense nor a true scientist.

Just as the sciences arise from technology, so philosophy arises from method.

Philosophy: Philosophers are not people who simply compile and organise truths discovered by others. True philosophers are those who seek the truth, who know the method of seeking the truth, and who are able to apply it.

Today, philosophy cannot be viewed as a mere collection of newly discovered facts. Philosophy consists of the methods that continually bring these facts to light and refine them. Once again, it is clear that we possess neither philosophy nor philosophers in the true sense of the word.

We must therefore strive, on the one hand, to remain a nation rooted in its history and traditions, and on the other, to develop applied sciences based on industry, and to create philosophies guided by scientific methods.

If we assimilate the sciences, philosophy, technology and methodology of the century into our national and religious traditions in the manner we have outlined, and blend them together, we can establish **a Contemporary Turkish-Islamic Civilisation**.

It is precisely when we attain this promised homeland—which the spirit of the people seeks as **the ‘Red Apple’** ( )—that we shall be truly free in a cultural sense and independent in terms of civilisation.

12 **Ijtihad:** Legal opinion, legal interpretation.

13 **Fiqh:** Religion-based law. The rules and rulings of this law.

14 **Bergson:** French philosopher (1859–1941). In his philosophy, he posits that the human spirit has a structure distinct from matter. He explains the phenomena of ‘consciousness and freedom’ in a non-material manner.

15 **Durkheim:** French sociologist (1858–1917). He was one of the scholars who most influenced **Ziya** Gökalp. In his works, he focused primarily on *morality and spiritual values*. According to him, social phenomena exist objectively, independent of the individual.

- IV - THE *CULTURAL* SOCIETY, THE CIVILISED SOCIETY

The reason why sociological researchers arrive at conflicting conclusions is that some seek social life in the ***cultural*** society, whilst others seek it in the ***civilised*** society.

This divergence of opinion first emerged in the definition of social phenomena. **Tarde** *defines social PHENOMENA as 'personal phenomena generalised through imitation'.*

Durkheim counters Tarde's ideas, stating: *"An event does not become a social event simply because it has been generalised through imitation. Perhaps it is generalised through imitation precisely because it is, in fact, a social event.*"

According to Durkheim, ***personal phenomena*** are needs that manifest themselves through an internal pressure within the individual's psyche—such as *'hunger, thirst, sleep*'. ***Social phenomena***, on the other hand, are concepts such as *'religious beliefs', 'moral duties', 'legal rules' and 'political and social ideals',* **which manifest themselves through an external pressure** on the individual's psyche.

These definitions show that Durkheim sought social life in cultural societies, whilst Tarde sought it in civilised societies.

It should be noted that so-called *'personal phenomena*'—whether *the needs* mentioned above or ***the senses*** such as *hearing, smelling, tasting and feeling*—are phenomena specific to life and the human species. *It is not correct to refer to* these *as 'personal phenomena'.*

As for the events that fall outside this category and are termed **'social events'**, these too can be divided into two categories: *psychological (personal, subjective)* and *objective (objective, external)* concepts.

Beliefs of a subjective nature, moral duties, concepts of beauty and all ideals are the beliefs of a culture (hars)

.

Scientific truths of an objective nature, rules pertaining to health, the economy and public works, agricultural and commercial tools, and all concepts of mathematics and logic are the views of a civilised society.

The external pressure exerted by the designs of a cultural community on individuals' minds is called **sanction** *(müeyyidiyet)*, whilst the external conformity to which the concepts of a civilised society are bound is called **objectivity** *(şeyiyyet, nesnellik)*.

When we fail to comply with health rules, we fall ill. This illness is the natural consequence of failing to comply with the laws of life.

When we neglect economic rules, we also fall into material hardship and poverty. This outcome is likewise an inevitable consequence of failing to comply with the laws of the economy.

Failure to comply with the rules of religion, morality and aesthetics, or with national ideals, does not result in the natural and inevitable consequences of such non-compliance, such as the *'ridicule' or 'mockery'* that the courts of conscience, or the conscience of the court, might direct at us, or that social taste might impose upon us.

These punishments are the result of the rules listed above being recognised as *'valuable'* in the conscience of the cultural society, and consequently becoming *'enforceable*'.

Cultural events engage the **conscience**—the faculty responsible for evaluating and classifying **constructive** concepts *(concepts related to desire)*, that is, values [16] *(the faculty of consciousness)*; whilst civilisational events have given rise to the faculty of reason *(the faculty)*, which is responsible for investigating and synthesising **'informative'** concepts *(concepts related to reporting)*, that is, facts.

'The individual within culture' is compelled to regard the demands of the social conscience as valuable ideals *(goals)* for themselves and to transform them into laws that must be obeyed, whilst *'the individual within civilisation'* is compelled to consider them within the logic of the social intellect.

The scientific concepts, technical tools and economic products of a civilisation are passed from one people to another through imitation and adaptation. Thus, a civilised society first manifests itself on a regional scale,

but over time, gradually embraces nations, continents and, ultimately, all of humanity. However, on this point, both **Tarde** and sociologists such as **Karl Marx** and **Edmond Demolins,** who were advocates of **'Historical Materialism'** (17), are correct.

If humanity were merely a civilised community consisting of individuals *(persons, individuals)*, it might perhaps be correct to attribute the generalisation of events solely to imitation, and to attach value in social life solely to technology and tools. Yet humanity is not merely a civilised community consisting of individuals.

Individuals have been moulded within numerous cultural communities—such as *the 'family', 'clan', 'district' (commune), 'guild', 'class', 'religious community', 'tribe', 'umma'* and *'state'*—and have ultimately lost their characteristics as individuals.

If we were to compare social phenomena to material ones, we could say the following:

The gathering of people, regarded as the parts of society, has not merely taken the form of an intermingling based on rules; rather, much like in chemical compounds, the individuals constituting society have been transformed into composite molecules, leaving behind these molecules and their composite form.

In this context, the fact that organisms of various shapes and characteristics are composed of cells, and that their existence is dependent on those social entities, can be explained in this way.

Since social agreements or institutions hinder people's freedom to associate, the imitation and exchange required by a civilised society cannot proceed without hindrance.

States prevent the free conduct of foreign trade by imposing high customs duties in order to protect and develop their own industries.

Nations, too, strive to preserve the purity of their national languages by avoiding the introduction of foreign words; to nationalise their literature, they abandon *'classical* literature' of an international nature and seek to draw their themes and principles from folk literature.

Ummahs, taking their religions as the foundation of international law and morality – just as Europe has always done, particularly during the Balkan War – recognise the sacred and inviolable rights of humanity solely for their own co-religionists.

The family, by establishing special bonds such as *'husband and wife'*, *'mother and father'*, *and 'child and sibling'*, presents the appearance of a community that has formed a complete unity in terms of property and coexistence vis-à-vis the outside world.

A tribe ***(oymak)*** brings together a community of shepherds; a **district**, a village or a town; **a guild**, those practising a particular craft; a **corporation**, all practitioners of a particular profession; and **a community**, people of the same denomination in a given region, uniting them as a single family in the face of outsiders.

The individual exists within each of these communities, guided by their own conscience, whilst living within a civilised society. It is precisely because **Durkheim** considered communities to be natural components of the social structure that he is recognised as one of the most influential sociologists.

The consciences of these cultural communities are in a state of constant conflict with the reason and logic belonging to society. The individual is sometimes unable to think rationally because they are a prisoner of their conscience. At other times, they stifle the feelings of their conscience by granting their reason more authority than it deserves.

This conflict between conscience and reason, or between *culture* and civilisation, is not an inevitable necessity. For *the role of conscience is to evaluate values that hold social appeal, whilst the role of reason is to thoroughly examine the objective realities concerning existence.*

The former *(that is,* ***conscience****)* answers our question *'Why live?'* with 'For *ideals and aspirations*'.

The latter *(that is,* ***reason****)* answers our question *'How SHOULD ONE LİVE?'* with *'In a manner consistent with reason*'.

Conscience guides our will through its *constructive (CREATİVE, FORMATİVE, volitional)* judgements. **Reason**, on the other hand, ensures we act prudently through its *informative (communicative)* judgements. In short, conscience shows us the goals, whilst reason shows us the means *(that is, conscience PROVİDES THE AİMS, and reason THE TOOLS to achieve them).*

According to **Edmond** Demolins, the aim of education and politics is to transform individuals who are culture-oriented into those who are civilisation-oriented. For he attributes the advancement of the Anglo-Saxons([18]) to their ***individualism*** *(or, in our terms, their civilisation-oriented* outlook*)*.

He, however, attributes the decline of Eastern nations to their being collectivist, communalist *(in our term, 'culture-centred'* nature. However, attributing the backwardness and development of nations to a single cause in this way cannot be considered scientific.

Furthermore, the claim that the Anglo-Saxons are individualistic rather than communitarian is also incorrect. Admittedly, the Anglo-Saxons are not as state-centred as we are. However, a cultural society is not an institution consisting solely of the state.

In England, the influence and power of local authorities—which function as cultural communities—along with the national religious organisation and the aristocratic order, are far greater than in many other countries. The fact that the Anglo-Saxons are a traditionalist society is also evidence of their cultural orientation. Nevertheless, cultural life there, despite this strength and solidity, has not hindered the development of civilised life.

Just as there can be *an unnatural conflict between culture and civilisation*, so too can unhealthy divisions arise between the consciences of various groups within a cultural society. For example, in some cases, an excessive attachment to family ties can even weaken national unity. In other cases, excessive devotion to religion can reach a point where it undermines national unity.

At times, a sense of nationalism may even seek to eradicate feelings of a shared homeland and state. In Europe, this situation gives rise to consequences deemed unhealthy for social life, such as classism, hostility towards the homeland and hostility towards the military.

The task of sociology is to transform these unnatural states of conflict within society—examples of which we have outlined above—into social peace. For instance, when necessary, the family must be prepared to sacrifice itself for the sake of the guild to which it belongs, and the guild, in turn, for the sake of the state. Likewise, the family and the state must value the religious and linguistic

communities within society; they must bear in mind that the nation—which must take precedence over all social groups—is composed of a linguistic community *(that is, a community formed by people who speak the SAME language)*, whilst international unity is formed by a civilisation community.

It should also be noted that a civilisational community begins in the form of 'market traders'. In the market, tradespeople such as tailors, shoemakers, bakers and haberdashers work solely for their own benefit. However, the work they carry out for their own benefit gives rise to ***the 'public good***'.

In the same way, each of the various nations within a civilised community has entered into a division of labour with the aim of creating a superior culture. Just as regional divisions of labour arise from the diversity of individual talents, so too do different cultures emerge among nations due to their differing national talents.

Peoples who initially began to draw closer to one another enter into mutual relations in the fields of trade, culture and technology. Over time, the scope of these relations also expands. Even in ancient times, *we can see THAT the peoples living in the Mediterranean region WERE engaging in trade with one another and exchanging knowledge and technology.*

The discovery of the Cape of Good Hope, the discovery of the Americas, the invention of the printing press, the opening of the Suez Canal, and the establishment of railways, telegraph and postal services have increased relations between nations and have progressively led to a globalised situation.

Cultural communities first emerge as a *'sop' (clan)* whose members regard themselves as descendants of the same ancestor. This means that the earliest cultural community is characterised by its *connection to religion and the family*.

As this family initially *LED* solely *a religious life*, it constituted *a religious community*.

All other social groups begin to emerge *from* this *religious community (that is, the family)* in turn: *the clan, the tribe, the village, the town, the class, the household, the congregation, the district, the tribe, the ummah and the state*.

Thus, the social principle governing a **civilised** society is the gradual expansion of its framework, whilst the principle governing a cultural society is the division and diversification of individuals according to their various roles within society.

It is clear from the above that the meaning of the term 'modernisation' is to attain a superior position, on a par with any other nation, in the ever-advancing scientific and technical standards of the contemporary civilised community.

Within a civilised society, aspiring to and living a life of shared standards does not conflict with the characteristics of family and state life, nor indeed with the cultural solidarity found within the community of the nation and the ummah.

We Turks, as equipped with the reason and science of our age's civilisation, must strive to create a **Turkish-Islamic culture**.

16 **Conscience:** The French word 'conscience' has different meanings in psychology and sociology. We adopt the term *'consciousness'* to correspond to its meaning in psychology, and *'conscience'* to denote its meaning in sociology. (Z. G.)

17 **"Historical Materialism":** A branch of Marxist philosophy based on dialectical materialism (materialism). According to this view, the causes of historical events and social developments are material. Material causes lead to class conflict, etc.

18 **Anglo-Saxon:** The name given to three Germanic tribes *(the Angles, Jutes and Saxons)* who lived on the British Isles and formed the core of the population of the Kingdom of Great Britain. Alongside English-speaking Britons, North Americans are also regarded as Anglo-Saxons.

- V - EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE TURKS

In Byzantium, where officials from various tribes once regarded the city as *the ‘ ’ (the ‘sanctuary of fortune’) and the ‘ ’ (THE ‘GATE of happiness’)*, a cosmopolitan[19] class had emerged.

They sought a name for themselves. Eventually, they settled on the term *‘şehrî’ (city-dweller)*. The ‘şehrî’ had no nationality.

As Sürurî[20] said to **Refii Ahmedi**:

Neither you nor I are city-dwellers For I
am Turkish and you are Kurdish

As is evident from these lines , the ‘Şehrî’ were neither Turkish, nor Kurdish, nor Arab, nor Albanian; in other words, they were a group hostile to all nationalities. This group disliked the Arabs, looked down on the Kurds, mocked the Laz, and insulted the Turks.

If you open **Ahmet Vefik** Pasha’s [21] ****Müntehebat-ı Durub-ı Emsal**** *(*Selections from Proverbs*)*, you will come across a number of disrespectful remarks about these peoples.

These words spoken by the Şehrîs are documents that clearly reveal the mindset of those who uttered them. Let us examine what is said about the Turks:

He thinks he’s become a lord the moment he
mounts a Turkish horse. For a Turk, the city
itself becomes a dungeon.
The Turk loves flattery, the Persian loves
mockery. A Turk’s work is a loan.
A Turk may be a scholar, but he is no man. What
does a Turk know of festivals? He just chatters
away whilst drinking his ayran. The Turk and
Tosun, for they were born of the same mother

/took their lessons from the donkey and the calf. A Turk's wits come later. There is no such thing as a Turkish association.

They gave the Turk a lordship, but first he killed his father.

In the history books of these cities, the names of the tribes were always written as follows:

Etrak-ı bî idrak *(Etrak = Turks, bî idrak = without understanding, uncomprehending)* That is to say***, the Turks without understanding or comprehension.***

Ekrad-ı bed-nihad *(Ekrad = Kurds, bed-nihad = of ill-born stock)*

This situation did not attract much attention in times when *nationalist* sentiment was not yet widely felt. However, as nationalist sentiment has recently begun to gain great importance, no other people apart from the Turks can tolerate these insults any longer.

Whilst, on the one hand, Christian peoples were pursuing the cause of independence, on the other hand, Muslim peoples were beginning to take pride in their own national identity and to prevent any disparaging remarks being made against their peoples.

The Arabs and Albanians were the first to introduce the concept of nationalism to the Islamic world.

In Egypt, **Abdullah Nadim** was striving to revive *Arab nationalism*, whilst in Istanbul, **Naim Bey Fraşeri** *(the elder brother of Şemseddin Sami, AUTHOR OF THE *KAAMUS-i Türkî*)* was endeavouring to revive *Albanian* nationalism.

For an ideal to take root, two emotions are required:

1. Love of one's nation… This emotion arises from traditions and sources of national pride.

2. National resentment… This arises from the awakening of bitterness and hostility in response to any oppression or persecution .

In both Abdullah Nedim and Naim Fraşeri, we see that they spread 'hostility towards *the Turks'* in order to stir up this national resentment.

One of the principles of Abdullah Nedim, who was the spiritual guide of **Arabi** Pasha[22], was the phrase ***'üttürüküttürük'*** *(abandon the Turk)*. As the ideas that the Albanian nationalist Naim Fraşeri sought to instil

have found a following in our country, so many of us are familiar with those ideas and their proponents.

Some 17 or 18 years ago, I came to Istanbul to enrol at a school. An Albanian doctor, who later gained fame in the political arena, said the following to me:

'We Albanians are ready to help the Turks to overthrow THE oppression and TYRANNY of the administration. But you must understand this POİNT clearly: in our view, there is no OPPRESSİON by Abdülhamid; there is Turkish OPPRESSİON upon us. The responsibility for the current regime lies directly with the Turks. If you do not put an end to this tyrannical government, we shall turn OUR WEAPONS not against the person who rules you (Sultan Abdulhamid), but against you yourselves."

Since then, I have observed that Albanian youths are spreading their nationalist ideas by arguing that the Turks are, by nature, incapable of progress and development, and that if they continue to live alongside the Turks, they too will perish.

These ideas they were trying to instil were not intended solely for Albanian youths. They were also attempting to spread these ideas amongst Arab and Kurdish youths. Indeed, they were even trying to convince the Turks themselves that they were barbarians and of low birth. For this reason, at that time, it seemed as though there was not a single servant of God who would adopt the name 'Turk'.

Whilst the people of Istanbul referred to themselves as 'Şehrî', they called those from the provinces *'Albanian', 'Arab', 'Kurd' or 'Laz'*, depending on the geographical region where they lived.

Accordingly, *those living in Rumelia were generally considered to be Albanians, those on the Black Sea coast Laz, and those in Eastern Anatolia Kurds.*

Those who could not identify with *this kind of ethnic identity, shaped by geography*, would voluntarily accept affiliation with one of the ethnic groups they regarded as more distinguished and superior to their own. For this reason, *despite being of Turkish descent, many young people TOOK PRİDE İN being Albanian or Kurdish.* ***It seemed as though not a single person took pride in being Turkish.*** No one wished to take on the name 'Turk', as if it were a term of shame

wanted to adopt the name *'Turk' as if it were a source of shame. In Eastern Anatolia, 'Turk' meant 'Kizilbaş', whilst in Istanbul it meant 'crude peasant'*.

Two of the most ardent friends of the Albanian nationalist Naim Bey *(Fraşeri)* were, in the eyes of others, Turks through and through.

Because of the ideas instilled by these men, *even SOME doctors FROM DİYARBAKIR and Harput—whose Turkish identity was never in doubt—CAME TO REGARD themselves AS Kurds.* No second example of such a tragic situation can be found in history.

Outside, in Europe, the Turks alone were blamed for the scandals in Turkey; whilst within the country, all ethnic groups—Muslim and non-Muslim alike—held the Turks solely responsible for the oppression by the Palace, the mistreatment by state officials and the government's corruption.

The Turkish people, however, could not step forward and declare, ***'I am here!'***

THERE WAS a burden of responsibility placed upon the Turks, but ***no shoulders to bear it!***

The Turks consisted of individuals left to their own devices, who had not been entrusted with a national duty!

It is futile to expect morality, national unity or self-sacrifice from a community that lacks a national consciousness or a national ideal. Thus, the social degeneration of the Turks—who, by nature, possessed a noble character—stemmed solely from the misconceptions of ***'failing to recognise their true selves'*** and ***'being unaware of their national responsibilities***'.

Yes, Europe was right. It was the Turks who were obliged to answer for the oppression and repression of the Abdülhamid regime. Even after the Second Constitutional Era, whichever party held power, the Turks were held responsible for their actions. It was the Turks who would ultimately bear the brunt of these developments. Indeed, when the Albanians rebelled, they expelled all Turkish officials, regardless of party affiliation. They also killed the Turkish officers and soldiers they captured.

The Tanzimat reformers had sought to cast a deceptive veil over the face of Turkishness in the following manner:

"There is no such thing as a 'national' n Turkish language! There is a common 'Ottoman Turkish' belonging to all these elements! All these elements had merged to form a new, exemplary nation, a historical lineage, an 'OTTOMAN Nation'. Just as this nation had its own distinct language, İT also HAD its own distinct history…" (23)

Naturally, none of the ethnic groups believed this lie. Each ethnic group taught its own history in its own schools. It taught its own language.

After the Second Constitutional Era, when undue importance was attached to this *'deception'* initiated by the Tanzimat reformers, *the minority groups* began to shout and protest, *'You want to Turkify us!'*

Indeed, this ***'Ottomanisation'*** policy was nothing more than the covert beginning of ***'Turkification***'. If the aim of 'Ottomanisation' was the state, then every Ottoman *subject* was already an individual within that state. If, however, the aim was to create a new nation whose language was Ottoman Turkish, then—since what they called 'Ottoman Turkish' was nothing other than Turkish—this new nation would, of course, be the **Turkish Nation** under a different name.

The various ethnic groups understood this situation very well and, in order to preserve their own national identities, began to attach greater importance to and organise their material and spiritual institutions more effectively.

It was the Turks alone who fell into this trap of the Tanzimat. Believing that their *language*—Ottoman Turkish—was in fact composed of three languages *(Arabic, Persian and Turkish)*, the Turks regarded speaking and writing in *the vernacular* as *reactionary and conservative.*

The spirit of the Tanzimat, whilst granting the people a form of sovereignty THEY WERE NOT YET ready to exercise under the Second Constitutional Era, did not grant them the right to USE their own language. Naturally, it could not tolerate them speaking of their national identity or national history.

Turkish youth soon realised that unless the language and literature were simplified, unless the national ideal gained the power to inspire and direct people towards self-sacrifice, and unless the struggle for a national economic life was freed from foreign influence and became self-sufficient, **Turkishness—**and with it, Ottomanism and Islam—would cease to exist.

On the other hand, they realised that unless they cast aside that deceptive veil obscuring their vision, they could not secure trust in the sincerity of any group, and that for this reason the goal of integrating the minorities could not be achieved.

Furthermore, he did not overlook the fact that, *whilst all other nationalities had been established, the failure to speak of the Turks' GLORİOUS sources of pride* would lead to the danger of Turkish youth being represented by other nations. Ultimately, it was the driving force of these three reasons ***that sparked the Turkish Ideal*** *(as a reaction).*

The emergence of this new nation *(that is, the Turkish Nation)* was also welcomed with joy by the nationalists of all the minority peoples. *The only ones who did not rejoice at this event* were *the urban elites and* the Tanzimat reformers.

Was the awakening ***of nationalist sentiment among the Turks*** beneficial or detrimental?

At this point, no one had put forward any argument that it was harmful. But the benefits were too numerous to count:

'(Thanks to this) ***the simplification and purification of the Turkish*** *language… THE LİBERATİON of our grammar from FOREİGN rules…*

Our poetry BEİNG WRİTTEN in the national metre (syllabic metre)...

Our literature being purged of Greek and Iranian tales and embellished with our own national stories and fairy tales…

National awakening alongside separation SEPARATİON is impossible that THE BEGİNNİNG of a religious awakening...

GİVEN to "ummah" and THE ESTABLİSHMENT OF unity...

The national economy...

National sport...

and

The development of national morality..

THE EMERGENCE among young people of a willingness ***to die for*** *a* ***national ideal****..*

Relations with a coexistence coexistence the *MAKES...*

A sense of national responsibility felt and embraced *by everyone..."*

Today, every Turk who loves his nation believes that he is obliged to refrain from harming his people through his actions and to strive to elevate his nation

. For this reason, they always endeavour to keep their duties in mind.

Turkish youth have understood very well that the most sacred duty today is for Turks to unite, setting aside all differences between political parties and social movements. Once this unity is achieved, the unity of Islam and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire will be placed on a more secure footing.

As soon as the Turkish nation came to understand its own existence, it also saw, in the light of this new sentiment, what the Arabs and other minorities needed in order to progress.

In the previous section, we noted that the Turks were held accountable for the actions of the government and political parties, and were consequently reprimanded. Naturally, as a consequence of this situation, certain positive developments in favour of the Turks would also follow. For example, the outcome that arose when the government granted certain concessions to the Arabs was termed the *'Turkish-Arab rapprochement*'. It was not referred to as a rapprochement between the government and the Arabs, or between **the Committee of Union and Progress** and the Arabs.

It is evident that, once **the Turkish nation** declared, ***'I am here too!'***, it was able to better understand the importance and necessity of its responsibilities and to find ways to get on better with those who share the same religion and belong to the same state—people from whom it is now impossible to distance themselves from **nationalist** sentiments.

Minorities, who until yesterday could not trust any government's promises regarding reform because they did not believe such governments would last, will, when they find an immortal Turkish nation that is aware of its duties and responsibilities, see the possibility of reaching an agreement with these enduring people and will no longer favour foreign supervision, as they do at present.

Once the Turk begins to show RESPECT for his own existence, he will also regard the national identities of the minorities as worthy of respect; just as HE RECOGNİSES his own rights and duties, he will not shy away from recognising those of the minorities.

Men arefe nefsehu fakad arefe gayrehu

(He who knows himself knows others)

Whilst some regarded the 'sense ***of nationhood'*** as legitimate and natural for all the peoples constituting the population of the Ottoman Empire, they excluded the Turks from this.

They would say:

'Since the Turks ARE in a position of dominance, they already possess all national rights. They have no RİGHTS that were previously forcibly taken from them and which they might therefore now wish to reclaim on the basis of a sense of national identity.'

If those who held this view had stated that *'the OTTOMAN Empire is a Turkish state'*, they might perhaps have been considered to have a valid point.

Yet they believed that this State, operating under the name 'Ottoman', was governed by a government comprising various elements.

As this state was not governed by a Turkish constitution, the Turks had no distinct political rights. Given this situation, it should come as no surprise that, like the ' ' and other elements, the Turks too felt the need for a national consciousness and national organisation.

As a sense of nationalism began to awaken among the Turks, the term 'Turk' came under attack in other ways as well:

Attempts were made to fabricate a connection between the brutal atrocities committed by Hülagu(24) and Turkism. On the other hand, Turkism was accused of being contrary to Islam.

Yet the aim of the Turkists was ***a 'Contemporary Islamic Turkism***'. For whilst **the** Turks' **national ideal** is Turkism, their ummah ideal is Islam.

In my view, the Turkists should also have a programme for the ummah. And it should include the following main principles:

1. To use the Arabic script, which is common to all Islamic nations, without altering it.
2. To organise terminology-setting congresses amongst all Islamic nations to standardise scientific terms, and to derive these terms from Turkish, Arabic and Persian

. (To achieve this AİM, an agreement HAD BEEN REACHED in Paris between Turkish, EGYPTİAN, Indian and IRANİAN students.)

3. To convene education congresses to facilitate the realisation of a common education system across all Islamic nations.

4. To establish a permanent link between the muftis of all Islamic nations.

5. The Ummah symbol , *Crescent's (the moon)*.

It is clear from these principles that Turkism is, at the same time, Islamism.

However, Turkish nationalists distinguish themselves from Islamic nationalists by identifying as 'Islamic ummah-ists' ( ).

For neither the Turks, nor the Arabs, nor the Indians *(Pakistanis)*, nor the Afghans, nor the Berbers([25]), nor the Persians can today accept the establishment of such an unnatural unity that eradicates the sense of nationality amongst the Islamic peoples.

In order to strengthen their national ideals, the Turks did not seek to instil 'national animosity' TOWARDS any people who were their fellow believers and FELLOW CİTİZENS. They did not follow the path of figures such as Abdullah Nedim and Naim of Fraşer, who later adopted this behaviour on the basis of Islamic pan-Islamism.

The presence of Christian Egyptians and Albanians in Egypt and Albania, and their coexistence with Muslims, may explain why these individuals have been drawn to such ideas.

In contrast, as the vast majority of Turks belong to the Muslim faith, the Turkish nationalists will never harbour any sentiments contrary to Islamic pan-Islamism.

Furthermore, as Turkists have also embraced the need for modernisation , they will maintain the respectful attitude towards non-Muslim peoples that this age of civilisation demands.

19 **Cosmopolitan:** Inclusive of people from various nations.

20 **Sürurî:** A poet and historian of 18th-century Divan literature. He authored a Divan. His historical works were compiled by **Ahmet Cevdet Pasha** in a book entitled ***Sürurî Mecmuası***.

21 **Ahmet Vefik Pasha:** (1823–1891). A statesman and literary figure of the Ottoman period, a great advocate of the Turkish national movement. He served as Speaker of the Parliament, Minister of Education and Grand Vizier in the Ottoman Empire. He spearheaded the Turkish nationalist movement during the Tanzimat era. He adapted plays by Molière. He translated the work ***Şecere-i Türki*** *(, *The Genealogy of the Turks*)* from Chagatai Turkish into Turkish. He compiled a dictionary entitled ***Lehçe-i Osmanî***. See: **Ahmet Vefik Pasha / Yalçın Toker**, *Toker PUBLİCATİONS, '100 Great Writers and Poets' Series, no. 50*

22 **Mürşid: One who** enlightens, guides, and offers counsel.

23 **Elements:** Each of the peoples—including Arabs, Greeks, Albanians, Bulgarians, Serbs, etc., alongside the Turks—that contributed to the formation of the Ottoman Empire is referred to as an 'element'. These constitute the minorities in relation to the Turkish element. **The view that** these elements came together **to form a unified whole known as the Ottoman Empire** is known as ***'ittihad-ı anasır' (the union of the elements)***.

24 **Hulagu:** (1217–1265) Grandson of Genghis Khan and founder of the Ilkhanate. He was renowned for his extreme bloodthirstiness and cruelty. He carried out vast conquests. *He captured BAGHDAD,* had the Abbasid Caliph Muttasim Billah murdered, *conquered Aleppo, and established the great Ilkhanate of his era.*

25 **The Berbers:** A people of Turkish origin, originally part of the Hamitic ethnic group, who spread across North Africa. They subsequently became largely Arabised. However, their customs and traditions differ from those of the Arabs. They crossed over to Spain alongside the Arabs. **Tariq ibn Ziyad,** the Conqueror of Al-Andalus, was a famous Berber.

- VI - EDUCATION

When one speaks of *Islamic education*, two concepts come to mind: Firstly, the methods applied by Islam in education.

The second is the education of children in accordance with Islamic *doctrine*[26]

Examining the educational methods of Islam is a subject for the history of education. Here, we shall not speak of history but of real life, and we shall demonstrate that education is one of the ideals of Islam.

If we examine a school's curriculum , we see that the knowledge we teach our children falls into three groups:

Firstly, **we teach our national language and literature,** as well as **our national history**; that is, the Turkish language and literature, and Turkish history.

Secondly**,** religious studies such as **the Holy Qur'an, Tawhid** [27], **Islamic jurisprudence** [28], as well as Islamic history and Islamic languages.

Thirdly, the sciences such as mathematics, physics and natural sciences, along with the foreign languages used to teach these subjects, as well as skills such as crafts and sport.

In short, the situation we are examining shows that there are three objectives to be pursued in education:

1. Turkish identity,

2. Islam,

3. Modernity.

A Turkish father could never accept his child not speaking Turkish, not reading or writing in Turkish, not knowing Turkish history, or remaining ignorant of Islamic history.

Just as every father wants his child to grow up as a Turk and a Muslim, he also wishes for them to be brought up as a modern person.

It follows, then, that for us, a complete education must consist of three elements:

1. Turkish education,

2. Islamic education,

3. and modern education.

Before the Tanzimat, our children were given only an Islamic education. The Tanzimat reformers sought to introduce a modern education system to our country. Initially, there were major conflicts between these two forms of education *(that is, Islamic and modern education).*

The establishment of the ***'Nizam-ı Cedit'*** in place of the Janissary Corps was regarded as blasphemy, meaning irreligion and a departure from religion . Wearing clothes like the Europeans was also seen as irreligious. There was also opposition to the introduction of subjects such as art and French in schools.

It was argued that the roundness of the Earth—just as the Sun revolves around it—contradicted the 'nâkil'[29].

In order to corroborate these facts, which had been proven through experimentation and reason, there was eventually a need to seek evidence from tradition.

Despite all this, modern education gradually began to take root and spread throughout society. As modern education came to be valued over time, Islamic education lost its significance. Although religious studies occupied an important place in school curricula, the decline of Islamic education was not quantitative but qualitative. Religious studies were not taught in a lively manner. Teachers of religious studies were losing the trust of their pupils because they viewed scientific facts through the lens of **bid'ah**[30]. Furthermore, the application of scientific methods in religious education had not yet begun.

It was at such a time that the

and the disasters that followed led to the emergence of two vibrant ideals: **Turkish Nationalism** and **Islamic Pan-Islamism**. Today, young minds awakened by the impact of these disasters attribute the responsibility for the defeat we have suffered to the lack of ideals in our education. On this subject, they say:

"We did not wish to provide our young people with either a national education or a religious education. Yet it is the sentiments of religion and nationalism that drive PEOPLE to willingly face death for sacred causes. Just as we failed to provide our children with a Turkish and Islamic upbringing, we also failed to provide a proper modern education. For the aim of modern education is to enable us to produce and utilise the technology and equipment that the most advanced nations PRODUCE and USE. Yet, just as in the economic sphere, we have demonstrated that WE ARE UNABLE TO USE the equipment (WEAPONS) EMPLOYED BY our contemporaries in the military sphere.

The measure of science is practice. Through our failure in the field of practice, we have also proven OUR BACKWARDNESS in science. It follows, then, that neither our higher education institutions, which are supposed to train specialists and scholars, nor our SECONDARY schools, which strive to educate ordinary CİTİZENS, have yielded any benefit."

The press, which values the new way of life, declared the failure of the Tanzimat education system on the basis of such arguments. Now, the intellectual community is endeavouring to lay the foundations of our new educational system.

Whilst Turkish educators and pedagogues are investigating the role that national ideals will play in this new way of life, contemporary educators are also endeavouring to determine which teaching methods should be applied in order to derive practical and economic benefits from the positive sciences.

During this period of intensive work, it is also necessary to investigate the foundations upon which Islamic education is based.

These **three forms of education** *(Turkish, modern and Islamic education)* should be mutually supportive, complementary and guiding. However, if the scope of their authority and the boundaries of this scope are not defined rationally and clearly, they may come into conflict with one another and even become adversaries.

If the modern education system begins to exert influence not only in the material sphere but also in spiritual matters, it will be regarded as encroaching upon the rights of Turkish and Islamic education. Defining the boundaries of national and religious education is even more difficult. Determining which of the Islamic traditions belong directly to Islam, and which belong to the national traditions of the Arabs, Persians or

Turkish national traditions requires very detailed research.

For this reason, Islamic Education, whilst accepting the Turkish and contemporary education systems, will endeavour not to allow these systems to encroach upon its own domain ; at the same time, it will strive to purge the true Islamic rules and traditions of both the customs and innovations that were first adopted from the Arabs and subsequently adopted from other peoples .

26 **Akaid:** Religious beliefs and the book that teaches these beliefs.

27 **Tawhid:** The science of reciting the Holy Qur'an in accordance with its proper method, and the book that teaches this recitation.

28 **Ilmihal:** A book written to teach the rules of religion.

29 **Nakil:** The acceptance of a fact not through reason but because it has been revealed by God. For example, the Prophet's Mi'raj is a nakil fact, not a rational one.

30 **Bid'at:** New doctrines and superstitions introduced into religious beliefs and principles after the time of the Prophet.

-VII- MEFKERE *(IDEAL)*

The germination of a seed is divided into two stages: the first is immediate, the second occurs over time. These stages are: *fertilisation and sprouting*.

The process of fertilisation is a creative phenomenon for seeds. Without it, the seed cannot sprout.

Just as a germinated seed sprouts, takes shape and grows, we observe the same stages in the formation of ideas put forward by a philosopher or in a poet's work. We might call the poet's inspiration *the 'fertilisation' of the imagination*.

The emergence of 'intuition' in a philosopher is regarded as the fertilisation of an idea. It is only after this fertilisation has taken place that the poet's imagination and the philosopher's power of thought become pregnant. Ultimately, a new work is born for the realms of literature and philosophy.

A people without a national identity is, too, like the essence of an organism. We might liken this to a poet's imagination or a philosopher's power of thought. It follows, then, that nations, too, must have their own phases of fertilisation, sprouting and maturation.

When a nation suffers a great catastrophe or faces a terrible danger, it erases the individual personalities of the people who make it up. At that time, only a national character survives in the collective spirit. In the hearts of the individuals who make up society, no emotion remains other than the desire to preserve this *'national character'*.

It is during this period of turmoil that *individuals* think *not of their own freedom, but of their nation's* İNDEPENDENCE.

This sacred thought, intertwined with a sacred sentiment, is called ***an ideal (*mefkûre*)***.

Times of crisis are the days of the ideal's creation. Ideals are born from this united heart when national calamities bring all hearts together into a single collective heart. Then, during their period of growth, they gradually branch out, giving rise to flowers and new social institutions.

The Ideal of *Germanness ( )*: *The ideal of Germanness sprang forth during the days of disaster when Prussia was trampled underfoot by Napoleon's army.* Even the philosopher **Fichte**[31], who had previously declared, *'My nation is all of humanity, and my homeland is the whole earth'*, felt at that moment that he was German to the very core and proclaimed it.

The Ideal of **Japanese-ness:** It reached a veritable breaking point whilst Japan was being subjected to dangerous and humiliating pressure by the Americans and Europeans.

The French Nation: Just as it was on the verge of annihilation under British occupation, national consciousness burst forth from a mentally ill peasant girl, turning her into its saviour.

Judaism and Christianity: The condemnation of the Children of Israel to annihilation in Egypt gave rise to Judaism, whilst the sufferings endured by the Jewish people under the oppression of the Roman Empire gave rise to Christianity.

The Birth of Islam: Islam was born during a deadly period when Arabia was subjected to political and religious invasions from three sides.

When a nation is in danger, it is not saved by individuals.

The nation becomes its own saviour. At that very moment, we see that individuals are imbued with a superhuman spirit, that personal desires vanish, and that the collective will becomes *the 'unity of souls*'.

Appearing to the individuals as a sacred and social ideal, the nation calls them to a promised victory, to a heralded paradise. It transforms the selfish into mujahideen who sacrifice their lives for the nation, and the cowards into heroes undaunted by danger. It bestows intelligence upon the foolish, diligence upon the idle, and a zeal for work upon the indifferent.

Once the period of disaster and crisis has passed, this sun of idealism that has been born in people's souls will never set. It drives the nation's every endeavour, like an inner spring, continuously and ceaselessly.

Just as the egg derives the vital impulse necessary for fertilisation from the sperm, so too do the institutions that constitute a nation draw the creative force that enables their development from the ideal. A **nation's *culture*** and **civilisation** are thus formed.

In times of calamity, the true ideals that suddenly spring forth from the crisis-sensitive consciousness of a nation—which absorbs its members into its own spirit—become the creators of the nation's future. We have no material instruments with which to observe the nation's future. For this purpose, we have spiritual instruments of observation, which are our **'national** ideals'.

Once a nation possesses a creative ideal, it no longer drifts towards an uncertain future; instead, an existing, joyful *paradise* appears each day more clearly and vividly, beckoning it towards itself.

States without ideals await an apocalypse that could strike at any moment. Whereas nations with ideals, even if they have, politically speaking, passed into the afterlife, are assured of a *'resurrection after death' (bas ü badelmevt)*.

It follows, then, that a state possessing a revitalising and creative ideal is immortal; it does not die.

Psychologists who labour over the question, *'DO individuals possess the strength of will to overcome their desires through a top-down influence, or not?'*, are debating in vain. It is individuals of strong will who form nations with an ideal. In nations without an ideal, however, it is difficult to find individuals who possess such willpower. Extraordinary acts of self-sacrifice and great renunciations—*which* demonstrate the existence of a superior will—may emerge during times of crisis that give birth to an ideal.

At the outset *of the* French *Revolution*, during a heated session of the National Assembly, all members of the nobility renounced their noble privileges.

Under the influence of the national movement of the 1870 war, the small German states renounced their rights to independence. They accepted Prussia as their leader

and aligned themselves with it.

At a time when Japan was faced with the choice of *'living with honour or dying with honour!'*, the nobility voluntarily sacrificed their vast estates for the sake of their country, bringing an end to the shogunate. The Mikado, too, voluntarily renounced the monarchy and declared that sovereignty belonged to the people.

The ancient ***'Jabriyya school of thought'***[32], which attributes this will to a superhuman power, is also correct. For it is the ideal that creates the will of individuals and directs it towards good or evil.

The individual mistakes the guidance of this national harmony for his own personal desires. He cannot conceive that these are the work of the national spirit.

The ideal manifests its power in two ways:

Attraction *(prestige)* and ***enforcement*** *(sanction)*: Attraction is the direct reflection of *the ideal (ideal)* upon the soul. When individuals are imbued with the ideal, their souls are filled with intense ecstasy *(exaltation)*. At that moment, plunging into a frenzy of excitement, they experience a tense, turbulent fantasy. The emotion that arises in their hearts at that moment is a sense of '*sacredness*'. These impassioned souls sanctify *(exalt)* and glorify their ideal and everything that supports it, whilst cursing those who oppose it.

Not only do they sacrifice their lives, interests and happiness for the sake of their ideal, but they also glorify and exalt those who promote it. They seek to destroy those who oppose it and everything associated with them.

Through this power of attraction, the ideal reduces individuals to the status of social robots or trance-like sleepwalkers. By stirring their souls with such fervour, it elicits superhuman achievements from these people who have lost themselves.

As for the ideal's coercive power… This is a consequence of its power of attraction. Those who are not enchanted by a sacred love for the ideal's emergence perceive its power indirectly. They realise that actions which align with or oppose the ideal will be met with a reaction from the society bound to it. This reaction of the ideal-driven society, which manifests itself in the form of approval or disapproval, is the driving force of the ideal; initially,

, takes the form of '*custom*'. Later, as it develops and takes shape, it assumes the form of '*law*'.

Attractiveness is the ideal's quality of beauty, whilst coerciveness is its compelling attribute.

Through these two attributes or powers, the ideal unites individuals in the same spiritual crucible, bringing them all into a state of mind of the same kind.

A child lives with impersonal emotions until the day they experience the sense of '*self*'. It is only after experiencing this sense of '*self*' that their personality, which until then had remained within an indefinite sense of existence, bursts forth. Just as experiencing the sense of '*self*' is for the child, so too is attaining its ideal for the nation.

However, as explained above, a nation can only perceive its identity during times of great calamity. In times of adversity, the national crisis is a social *Gabriel (the angel)*, through which the nation begins to sense and understand who it is, where it comes from, where it is going, and what historical duty it must fulfil.

ADDITION:

Some refer to *the 'ideal' (mefkûre)* as a dream, a goal, an aspiration or a wish. As is clear from the explanations above, the ideal is neither a spiritual life actually experienced by a nation during a past period of crisis, nor a goal to be achieved in the future.

The 'mefküre' is not only the shaper of the present and the creator of the future, but also a reality of the past. It is the driving intellectual force that springs from the nation's past and guides it towards the future.

It is therefore more appropriate to use the term *'mefkûre'*—derived from 'fikir' ( )—in this sense, just as *'ideal'* is derived from '*idée*'.

31 **Fichte:** (1762–1814) A renowned German philosopher. Like **Schelling** and **Hegel**, he adopted Kant's philosophy, which is based on the principle of morality and the supremacy of morality, and sought to develop it further. He held the chair of philosophy at the University of Jena.

32 "***The Cebriye school***": Determinism. The belief that everything, whether good or evil, originates from God. A school of thought which holds that it is impossible for people to alter what has been predestined by God through their own free will.

- VIII - THE TURKISH NATION AND TURAN

No matter how clearly Turkish nationalism is explained, certain minds and ideas still cannot shake off their doubts and uncertainties.

Ideals, being encircled by an aura of sanctity, cannot be easily analysed or unravelled. Their power to convince stems not so much from the logical clarity of their meanings as from their spiritual appeal. However, as time passes, the initial sense of awe begins to wane, whilst the need for clarity and transparency begins to grow.

For this reason, today;

'Is there such a thing as a Turkish nation?

Or can such a nation be created?"

we should not be surprised.

Indeed, from Kazana Turkishyoung man here one of the pioneers of Turkish nationalism here.

Everyone should reflect on this important issue, which concerns all Turks, and be able to have their say.

To this end, I am bringing this topic—which I believe warrants in-depth examination—into the realm of discussion.

The young man from Kazan says:

"Is my nation the Turkish people, which includes the Uzbeks, KYRGYZ, Turkmen, SARTS, OTTOMANS, Tatars and AZERBAİJANİS?

Or, since each of these is a nation in its own right, is my nation solely Tatar?

In other words, will 'Turkishness' remain a single nation, or will it become a community encompassing many nations?"

Whilst he does not provide a definitive and clear answer to this question himself, he puts forward two pieces of evidence

:

First piece of evidence: As the Turkish nations listed above are geographically distant from one another and have limited contact, they will gradually diverge linguistically; the fact that they possess independent literatures will also accelerate this differentiation.

Second piece of evidence: Whilst the Northern Turks have been brought up within Russian culture, the Ottoman Turks are nourished by French or German cultures. Thus, Turkishness is also splitting into two distinct parts in terms of culture and civilisation.

RESPONSE TO THE FIRST ARGUMENT: In times when means of communication such as the postal service, telegraph and the press did not exist, the Turkic nations could have drifted apart from one another in terms of language and literature.

Just as the **Seljuk** and **Chagatai** Turks, from the 13th century onwards, developed their own distinct literatures during the same historical period without being aware of one another. Furthermore, the fact that the Turks, prior to Islam, adopted various religions and writing systems without knowing of one another was precisely the result of this distance and lack of contact between them. Nevertheless, this distance did not prevent all Turks from embracing Islam together, inspired by a sense of **kinship** *(as brotherly peoples)*.

However, a time came when, once again due to the effects of this distance and lack of contact, a section of the Turks, following the example of the Persians, turned to Shi'ism. Yet today we see that the sense of kinship has eliminated the emphasis on sectarian differences. Indeed, had the era of ignorance lasted a few more centuries, the Turks too would have split into many tribes in terms of language and kinship.

Just as the Slavs, Latins and Kurds have been divided into many different tribes since ancient times… (Today, the Kurds consist of five tribes who do not understand one another's languages). *(See **Sociological Studies on Kurdish Tribes / Ziya Gökalp**, Toker PUBLİCATİONS, Istanbul.)*

As the Turks led a nomadic way of life, they did not experience such a division in the past. Although the Arab tribes were settled across vast territories

, yet because they maintained constant contact with one another due to their nomadic way of life, they managed to preserve the unity of the Arabic language.

For the Turks, in addition to causes such as nomadism, enslavement and migration, there was a ceaseless succession of major, turbulent periods of unification and assimilation, such as the invasions by **Mete, Komene, Bilge Khan, the Khans of Kashgar, the Seljuks, Genghis Khan and Tamerlane**. It is for this reason that today almost all Turks are peoples who understand one another's languages. And since the era of mutual acquaintance has begun, there is now no possibility of them drifting apart.

The circulation of Turkish books from hand to hand amongst the Turkic peoples played a significant role in preventing the Turks from drifting apart linguistically. Whilst the Divans written in Chagatai Turkish were read by the Western Turks, works written in Ottoman Turkish were transported, chest by chest, to Crimea, Kazan, the Caucasus and Turkestan. The dissemination of Ottoman Turkish books increased significantly, particularly after the Turks came to know one another. First, in Crimea and the Caucasus, Istanbul literature began to be imitated and the language started to align with Istanbul Turkish. This movement then spread to Kazan and Turkestan.

However, a major adversary that emerged at this time sought to hinder this 'linguistic unification' movement by exerting its influence through three channels.

These were:

1. Socialism: If there is any idea that is not conducive to the national interests of the Turks, it is undoubtedly socialism. For socialism is the enemy of the concept of nationhood.

Yet the very factor that will save the Turks from all forms of annihilation is the concept of nationhood.

Furthermore, socialism naturally arises from large-scale industry. The Turks, however, have not yet made sufficient progress in the industrial sector to give rise to socialism.

The idea of socialism, which began to take hold in an unnatural way amongst the Northern Turks, led to the emergence of regional literatures. Yet the spoken languages of every nation possessing a single written language

are distinct from one another. Elevating regional dialects to the status of a written language, and deriving a separate literature from each of them, poses a grave danger to national unity. For instance, if literature were to be produced in the vernacular of every region in Turkey, hundreds of distinct Turkish languages would emerge. The implementation of such a situation would be the most dreadful death for all nations.

2. Despair: European newspapers constantly spoke of Turkey's weakness and its inability to survive. European press agencies, too, consistently disseminated biased reports along these lines. Some of the Turkish newspapers in the north also published these malicious false reports without a second thought.

Consequently, people began to lose hope in the Turks' civilisational capabilities. Ultimately, the idea of creating an artificial Tatar civilisation began to take shape.

In reality, however, the term 'Tatar' is a name given in ancient Turkish history to a foreign tribe with no connection whatsoever to today's Northern Turks. Neither **Genghis Khan** nor **Tamerlane had any regard for the Tatars**. *It follows, then, that the Tatars were neither Turks nor Mongols. Therefore, the Northern Turks must never accept this NAME, which the Russians HAVE ADOPTED AS A TACTİC to both belittle and divide the Turks. The Northern Turks are generally Kipchak Turks.*

3. Restrictions on schooling: Some governments have begun to prevent various Turkic nations from assisting one another in teaching and education. The use of each nation's own textbooks in the schools of other nations has been banned. *(For example, Uzbek textbooks are not TAUGHT in Kyrgyzstan, nor are Kazakh textbooks TAUGHT in Azerbaijan.)*

Furthermore, it was argued that the local language should be the language of instruction for Muslims in every region. The aim of all these pressures and regulations was to divide the Turkic nation into various nations.

To swallow up a people, one must first break them up and divide them into fragments. To fragment a nation, one must first divide and fragment its language. Some of those who do this do so knowingly, whilst others do so unwittingly.

The Turkish language thus began to be fragmented along these three lines, leading to the emergence of multiple literary traditions. Turkish nationalists such as **Kadı Rızaeddin** and **Musa Begyif** Efendi, recognising the danger of this situation, continued to write their works exclusively in standard Turkish.

The Tercüman newspaper, published in Crimea, also upholds the traditional principle of ***'unity in thought, unity in language, unity in action***'. **The Şelale magazine,** published in Baku, directly advocates the use of classical Ottoman Turkish.

It follows, then, that there are two currents amongst the Turks of Russia:

The first is to value regional dialects; the second is to accept Istanbul Turkish as the national language and to strive to make this language widespread.

Those who have been swept up by the first trend are, without a doubt, unwittingly playing into the hands of Turkey's enemies. Those who think with a true Turkish consciousness, however, are turning towards the second trend.

As it is impossible to create an artificial Turkish language by merging all Turkish dialects, no third current has been added to those we have mentioned.

All existing languages consist of dialects and regional variants. It is only natural for every language to be composed of various components. However, upon closer inspection, one can see that there is a *'literary unity'* transcending this fragmented state. The language of a nation's capital—generally speaking—possesses political prestige and social appeal.

The renowned French sociologist **Tarde** states that;

"During the feudal period, fame resided amongst the nobility. Once the monarchy was established, however, fame became centred on the capital."

Fame and prestige are the foundation and measure of a nation's social consciousness.

The nation evaluates all its values against this foundation and standard.

The fact that Istanbul possesses the allure of a capital city is not solely a matter concerning the Ottoman Turks. Istanbul is the **'Ordu-Kent**' *(capital city)* of the sole Turkish Khaganate.

For this reason, it is also regarded as the spiritual centre of the entire Turkic world. Furthermore, Istanbul is the centre of the Islamic Caliphate. Thus, in addition to its national appeal, Istanbul also possesses a religious sanctity.

It is precisely because this appeal and sanctity have been embodied in the language that **Istanbul Turkish is the national language for all Turks**. Moreover, Istanbul Turkish is the most beautiful, the most refined, and the richest in terms of literature and scholarship amongst all Turkish dialects.

Therefore, despite any obstacles that may arise, establishing Istanbul Turkish as the literary language is a national duty for all Turks.

RESPONSE TO THE SECOND ARGUMENT: The aim of Turkism is to create a Turkish *culture*. This culture will, quite naturally, be shared by Turks in the East, West, North and South. In this way, the destructive consequences of Western Turks imitating French culture and Northern Turks imitating Russian culture will also be averted.

All Turks should have a single culture, and this must be a culture of their own making.

The more a Turk becomes Germanised, Frenchified or Russified, the more he becomes fragmented.

To summarise, the acceptance of the Istanbul dialect as the national language and the endeavour to create a Turkish culture within European civilisation will form the basis for the establishment of a **Turkish** nation, whilst terms such as **'Ottoman', 'Kipchak', 'Uzbek' and 'Kyrgyz'** will remain merely regional designations.

As for the word 'Tatar', scientific research will eventually reveal that this term was a label bestowed as a result of hostility towards the Northern Turks; consequently, the Tatarist movement will also collapse.

So where, then, is the homeland of the general Turkish nation? In answer to this, we say:

The homeland is neither Turkey nor Turkestan for the Turk; the homeland is a vast and eternal land: Turan.

Turan is an *ideal* homeland that unites all Turks whilst excluding foreigners.

Turan is the sum total of all the lands where Turks dwell and the Turkish language is spoken.

- IX - NATION AND HOMELAND

Man's current situation in relation to nature is quite clear:

To study natural phenomena through observation and experimentation, thereby uncovering the laws of nature.

Yet a few centuries ago, the situation was quite different. Natural philosophers felt no need to observe reality *(the truth)* or to conduct experiments on it. To understand the world, it was deemed sufficient to know the principles of reason and to deduce their logical conclusions through analogy. For example, they explained the formation of the four elements—earth, water, air and fire—as follows:

'Cold dryness combined earth, the combination of cold and moisture produces water; the combination of heat and moisture produces air; and the combination of heat and dryness produces fire." Thus, once **the four fundamental elements** *(heat, cold, dryness, moisture)* were established, it was quite easy to construct the science of nature by analogy. Moreover, this approach was not limited to theory alone. The same method was also applied in matters that, at the very least, required an experiment based on voluntary participation:

"Diseases arise from the predominance, in the constitution, of either dampness, dryness, cold or heat. The aim was to utilise precisely these properties in the medicines used. For example, if a disease had arisen from cold and dryness in the constitution, the medicine administered SHOULD HAVE WARMİNG and drying properties."

Today, however, such *a 'conceptual approach'* has no place in the field of natural science. In our country, those engaged in the physical and natural sciences attach importance solely to observation and experimentation. They also endeavour to derive concepts from facts.

In the media today, three concepts were the subject of social debate:

Turkish nationalism… Islamism… Ottomanism…

These concepts can have no meaning unless they become symbols of social entities and derive their value from social realities. No matter how many years of ideological battles are waged over these three terms, no result can be achieved.

If we look at social realities, we see that there is an Islamic Ummah, an Ottoman State, a Turkish Nation and an Arab Nation. For these judgements to correspond to reality, it is only natural that the term **'Umma'** should be used to refer to all people with close ties to a religion, the term **'state'** to the entirety of people under the administration of a government, and the term **'nation'** to the totality of people who speak the same language. For those who accept the use of these words in these senses, the above statement is correct and true.

Consequently, those who do not accept this judgement do so not because the meaning is inconsistent with reality, but because they do not consider it appropriate to accept these three terms in those senses as idioms.

On the one hand, **Islamists** argue: *'The word "millet" corresponds to* THE MEANİNG *you refer to as "ümmet". This word also means* ***"sect"*** *in Arabic.'*

In response to these objections, it may be said that the richness of a language lies in the fact that every word has a meaning, every meaning has a single word, and, in particular, that words to convey every meaning are invariably available.

Even if people do not do this, the language does so of its own accord.

This is precisely why the **term 'ümmet'** has come to be used for the entirety of people belonging to a particular religion, and **'millet'** for the entirety of people belonging to a particular language.

Since the majority use these words in these senses, you will of course accept this. It is by no means right to make a fuss over idioms.

On the other hand, **the Ottomanists** say:

'The terms "state" and "nation" are synonymous.' The entire population of a state constitutes the nation. If we look solely at the relationship between these concepts, without taking social reality into account, this view must be correct.

Admittedly, it is more in line with reality and desire for the entire population of a state to speak the same language, or for those speaking the same language to form an independent state. But are all states like this in the face of sociological realities? Undoubtedly, they are not.

Given this situation, how can it be appropriate to imagine what ought to be, whilst failing to see what actually is?

After criticising these claims put forward by these two groups ***(Islamists and Ottomanists)***, **the Turkish nationalists** draw the following two conclusions:

1. The ummah is one thing; the nation is another.

2. The state is one thing; the nation is another.

These conclusions may be contested, but only in terms of whether they correspond to social realities… not by asking, *'SHOULD İT HAVE BEEN this way?'*

We can adapt our concepts to social realities. But we cannot make reality conform to our concepts!

Similarly, the realities that lie outside the concepts of **'Umma, Nation and State'** are not entirely separate from one another.

The relationship between **'Umma'** and **'Nation'** is akin to that between **the 'General'** and **the 'Particular**'.

'Umma' is the name given to the totality of nations belonging to a single religion. In other words, it is a very large community.

Furthermore, the people who make up the nation are not merely those who speak its language. Those who will speak that language in the future are also part of that community.

For example, although the Pomaks speak Bulgarian and the Muslims on Crete speak Greek today, tomorrow, under the influence of Muslims, they will learn Turkish and abandon the languages they speak today. This means

the members of a nation are defined not only by their language but also by their religion.

There is, to a certain extent, a relationship between *'State'* and *'Nation'* akin to that between *the 'general'* and *the 'particular*'. For example, the Ottoman State is an Islamic State, that is, a state founded upon Muslim nations. Alongside its very existence, the two major pillars underpinning its culture and science are the Turkish and Arab nations. *It may therefore be said that the **Ottoman** State is a **Turkish-Arab** state.*

It should also not be forgotten that the Turkish and Arab nations are not limited solely to the Turks and Arabs living within Ottoman territories. Those living in captivity and speaking the same language must also be considered part of these nations. *(For example, the Turks of Turkestan under Russian rule...)*

Let us now turn to the concept of **'Homeland**'. The Homeland is a sacred land for which lives are sacrificed. How is it that, whilst all other countries are not **'sacred'**, the country we call **the 'Homeland'** is recognised as such? And how is it that those who regard it as sacred are able to sacrifice their lives, their families, and the things they love most for the sake of that country? Undoubtedly, that country has not acquired this value solely because of its material structure. It must derive this sacredness from a sacred entity.

What could this sacred entity be? The

state?

As we have seen above, the state is not a power that exists in its own right. The state derives its power from the nation and the ummah:

"Sharaf al-makān bil-makīn" *(The honour of a place lies with those who dwell there.)*

If that is the case, there are only two things that can be considered sacred entities: **the nation** and **the ummah.**

Since there are two sacred realities, there must also be two homelands, which serve as their symbols or headquarters:

'The Ummah's homeland', 'The Nation's homeland'.

Indeed, there is an **'Islamic Homeland'**, which is the beloved homeland of all Muslim nations. The second is the **'National Homeland'**, which the Turks call **Turan**.

The Ottoman Empire is an independent part of the Islamic Homeland. One part of this is the Turkish Homeland, which is also a part of Turan. The other part is the Arab Homeland, which is a part of the Greater Arab Homeland.

The fact that the Turks embrace the Turkish Homeland—that is, Turan—with a special love does not require them to forget either the **'Small Islamic Homeland'**, namely the Ottoman Empire, or the **'Great Islamic** Homeland'. For ***the 'National Ideal', the 'State Ideal' and the 'Umma Ideal'*** are distinct ideals, and all three are sacred.

- X - THE NATIONAL IDEAL *(IDEAL)*

Some young people ask:

"Since ideals arise from historical complexities and social crises, might it not be expected that, after a while, a new ideal—born of different circumstances and conditions—WİLL SUPPLANT the love of the nation?

For example, is there not a possibility that, in the near or distant future, the idea of ***'socialism'*** *MİGHT BE REGARDED AS superior to the 'sense* ***of nationhood****'?"*

I can answer this question as follows:

An ideal, or 'ülkü', is, in essence, the sense of belonging felt by the members of a social community. Just as sunlight cannot demonstrate its burning quality unless it is focused through a lens, so too can a community not reveal the sacred quality inherent within it unless it attains a state of collective fervour.

However, even before taking on a conscious form, this sacredness already existed unconsciously within the spiritual unity of the community. The task of an enthusiastic community is to transform the community from a mere passive entity into a concentrated one, and to reveal to its members this truth—which until then had remained hidden as a *'hidden treasure'*—together with the necessary circle of sacredness.

However, inspired communities bring about the emergence of the ideal by transforming a community that was previously in a scattered state into one that is united and concentrated.

The emergence of the ideal from nothing signifies that the community has transitioned from a state of unconsciousness to one of conscious development.

Even before *the ideologies of Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism* came into being, the Ottoman Empire, the Islamic Ummah and the Turkish Nation already existed.

In Europe, before large-scale industry brought workers together and gave rise to the ideal of socialism, the working class did indeed exist, but it was in a fragmented state.

It follows, then, that for a community to emerge in people's consciousness at a time of crisis, declaring *'I exist!'*, it must have existed beforehand, together with a set of institutions organised into a specific structure.

Whether an organisation is political, religious or linguistic in nature, it must undoubtedly have existed beforehand. No passionate community can bring into being a newly formed community with no past. As for communities not based on an existing organisation, not only is the birth of a new ideal impossible, but in fact, the very formation of such a community is impossible. For only that which possesses the capacity to expand can actually expand.

The following conclusion follows from these words:

"A great community that will emerge in the future must necessarily be based on one of the communities that exist today. An ideal that will arise in the future must also necessarily spring from the unity of one of today's communities."

Therefore, whichever of the existing communities is the richest and strongest in terms of organisation, whilst also being capable of bringing other communities into its own structure and assimilating them, it is essential that the great ideal should arise from within that community.

Let us now seek out this unifying community:

Among the existing communities, the one capable of fulfilling this task is the **'language community',** that is, the 'nation'. For since those who speak a common language are generally people of the same lineage, a **'nation'** is at the same time an **'ethnic group**'.

The concepts of language and tribe are so closely linked that, when the term 'ancestry' is mentioned outside the field of *anthropology* today, what first comes to mind is **'a family of tribes sharing linguistic affinities**'.

The lineages known as the Indo-Europeans, the Semites, the Bantu *(THE PEOPLES OF southern Equatorial Africa)* and the Ural-Altaics are nothing other than families of peoples—that is, families

families.

Indeed, amongst the Indo-Europeans, all three of the general racial types recognised in anthropology**—'long-headed fair-haired', 'long-headed dark-haired'** and **'round-headed dark-haired'—**are present. For example, **Germans** are predominantly of the *'LONG-HEADED fair-haired'* type, **Spaniards** and **Southern Europeans** of the *'LONG-HEADED dark-haired'* type, and **Slavs** of the *'ROUND-HEADED dark-haired'* type.

However, whichever European nation we examine, we find that all three of these types are present in varying proportions.

It thus becomes clear that the term **'tribe'** refers to *a 'language family'*, whilst the term **'race'** *(lineage)* refers to *'types exhibiting STRUCTURAL similarities*'.

Therefore, a 'tribe' refers to a people who, in very ancient times, lived as **a 'community speaking the same language'** but later dispersed.

As for lineage… This, too, consists of anatomical types that are not all found in one place or together, but are scattered amongst all nations.

Nowadays, the lineage one takes pride in belonging to is undoubtedly understood not as an anatomical type, but as **a 'tribe'—**that is, a community formed by people who share the same language. So, is a community united by language—that is, a nation—not a part of this so-called 'tribe'?

Secondly, language has another function: as a means of expressing feelings and thoughts, and as the bearer of traditions and customs, it also takes on the task of ensuring that those who speak it share the same aspirations and upbringing, the same conscience and understanding.

For these reasons, it is only natural that people who share a common spirit and the same sentiments should tend to adopt the same religion.

Based on this, we also observe that societies sharing the same language generally adopt the same religion. Although certain specific reasons may initially hinder this religious unity to a greater or lesser extent, history shows us that those who speak the same language gradually come to share the same faith. For example, the new

The Latins adopted Catholicism, **the Germans** Protestantism, and **the Slavs** Orthodoxy.

Among the Ural-Altaic peoples, **the Mongols** became Buddhist, **the Manchus** Confucian, and **the Finno-Ugrians** Christian.

Whilst some **Turks** were initially *Buddhist, Manichaean, Jewish or Christian*, following the adoption of Islam by the vast majority, almost all of them converted to Islam, with the exception of approximately 200,000 *Shamanist* Yakuts.

The reason the Yakuts have remained outside Islam is that their homeland lies far removed from the Turkic world. They will either adopt Islam and remain Turkic, or accept Christianity and become fully Russified.

Just as language influences the adoption of a religion, so too does religion influence the adoption of a nationality. In the past, **Protestant French people** expelled from France settled in Germany and **became Germanised** there. **The** ancient **Bulgarians became Slavicised** by embracing Christianity.

Do we not see today that certain non-Turkish Muslim minorities, who have migrated to our country in a scattered manner, are becoming Turkified under the influence of religious unity?

It follows, then, that there is a genuine bond between communities that share the same language and those that share the same religion.

Thirdly, once the principles of **'compulsory military service'** and **'national sovereignty'** were accepted, the defence of the homeland ceased to be the sole responsibility of the trained *CAVALRY (*sipahi*)* units, whilst the administration of the state was no longer in the hands of a class of officials accountable only to the rulers.

Peasants, whose only weapon was the plough, and townspeople, accustomed to a life of leisure, became soldiers. The people, who had no experience whatsoever in governance, assumed the role of the government's watchdogs.

It was therefore necessary to instil **'patriotism**' in these new soldiers and to teach this supervisory populace what the 'duty of election' entailed. During the process of educating the people and the widespread and generalised implementation of national education and instruction, disagreements arose amongst the tribes subject to the state regarding the language in which

led to disputes among the peoples subject to the state.

The states began to put forward the aim of spreading the official language, whilst the ethnic groups sought to have their own languages accepted by the state as a means of education and instruction.

For this reason, as it was deemed impossible for either the State or the Nation to be based on a single language in the last century, the model adopted—as in Austria and Hungary—was to rely on two communities sharing the same language. Today, confidence is placed in the future of States in Europe formed by communities sharing the same language.

Communities sharing the same language demonstrate the hope they harbour for the future by defining, at the very least, the spiritual boundaries of the national homeland.

It is now well known to everyone that the ideas **of 'State and Fatherland'** fostered amongst the various elements are doomed to remain concepts devoid of love, passion, colour and spirituality.

Just as there cannot be a shared beloved , there cannot be **a shared homeland** either. A state not grounded in a shared consciousness degenerates into nothing more than a place where people merely fill their bellies.

A country that is not a nation's homeland remains merely a *soup kitchen*(33) where people come to fill their bellies.

Institutions such as the state and the homeland gain eternal life if they are founded on national ideals. If they rely solely on individuals, they are doomed to collapse.

People without ideals remain empty and wasted, for they are selfish and self-serving, hopeless and pessimistic, faithless and cowardly.

States must undoubtedly be founded on national ideals, and every part of the homeland must necessarily be the homeland of a state; only in this way can that place be saved from being merely a piece of land and be granted a chance at life.

It is evident that ***'linguistic communities'*** also encompass the concepts of the state and the homeland.

Smaller communities such as the family, social class, professional guild, village, tribe and religious groups are also parts of the national community.

A family consists of people who share a common religion. They speak the language of the nation to which they belong.

Other communities, like the family, share commonalities in terms of religion and language. Therefore, all of these are specific components of the national community, that is, the nation. To summarise… Whatever ideals belong to the tribe, the ummah, the state, the homeland, the family, the class, the professional guild, and so on, all of them are ideal.

As social development prioritises mental and emotional factors over material ones, the value and effectiveness of language—the medium through which these are expressed—will steadily increase; and thus, **the 'sense of nationhood'** will become an eternal ideal.

Admittedly, once large-scale industry has been established in Turkey, the ideal of socialism will emerge here too. However, like the other minor ideals we have touched upon above, this will remain merely a subsidiary of the national ideal.

Although socialism continues to grow in strength amongst the nations of Europe, it generally yields its place to the national ideal once again during times of war. Apart from political conflicts, and even in the economic sphere alone, the class ideal remains subordinate to the national ideal.

Furthermore, upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that 'language' is the single essence of all social activities, such as religion, morality, law, economics and the fine arts.

For all these activities to hold value, the language must be accorded importance.

Language is the foundation of social life, the fabric of spirituality, and the cornerstone of culture and civilisation. Therefore, regardless of which community or which activity is concerned with, all future social currents—whether directly or indirectly—will invariably consolidate the linguistic community, and from this turmoil**, the 'ideal of nationhood'** will inevitably emerge in a more vigorous and powerful form.

33 **Imaret:** Charitable institutions providing services to the poor and travellers, such as free food and drink, accommodation and fodder for their animals. These institutions, of which there were many examples during the Ottoman Empire, were, in terms of their establishment and operation, similar to waqf organisations.

- XI - NATIONALITY AND ISLAM

There is a spiritual microbe that has been attempting to dismantle the Ottoman Empire—the last hope of the Islamic world—for over a century. Until now, this microbe has been the enemy of the Ottoman Empire and has caused great harm to Islam. However, today it has turned in favour of Islam and is endeavouring to undo the destruction it has wrought. This microbe is the idea of nationalism.

Indeed! It is this dreadful idea that gave rise to Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, Bulgaria, and the islands of Samos and Crete; that caused the Ottoman Empire to suffer fragmentation every quarter of a century; and that ultimately led to the loss of Rumelia.

This idea was not a pathogen, but a social leaven. It must be noted with regret that, to this day, we have not fully understood what it was.

It has continually acted as a leaven against us in the realms of language, literature, the economy, education and, finally, politics.

We believed that we could halt these developments—which are of the utmost importance to social life—by implementing reforms, establishing organisations and institutions, but our efforts were in vain. We failed to realise that the century in which we find ourselves is **the 'century of nations**'.

It never occurred to us to harness this social force, even in part, for the benefit of Islam and the Ottoman Empire.

Well, what's done is done… The idea of nationalism did everything possible to the detriment of Islam.

At last, the turn has come for the Islamic world to wield this weapon.
Up until now, the fundamental belief of all Muslims has been as follows:

"There is only one true State on earth, and that is the Islamic State. Whichever state's rule they may find themselves under in practice,

, the only authority to which all Muslims can turn for justice and REFUGE *is the Islamic Caliph."*

In practice, allegiances are in fact temporary and amount to nothing more than coercion. Before long, a leader will emerge; a saviour, a guide, will come to rescue them from this wretched captivity.

The sermons recited in the name of **the Caliph** during Friday and Eid prayers, and the gatherings held at Arafat during the days of the Hajj, are harbingers of the political future.

This notion is undoubtedly a state of mind that fills all our hearts with sacred and sublime elation. If a happiness to be attained theoretically were sufficient for the lives of billions of people, then a purpose within our hearts alone would suffice for us.

However, if its mere existence in the theoretical realm is insufficient and its actual existence is a prerequisite, then, first and foremost, we must strive to climb the necessary steps of progress one by one in order to attain it.

It is evident that whilst Muslim peoples await future happiness with hope, they are content to be represented by the governments and nations in which they live—first in terms of language and economy, and subsequently in terms of thought and morality.

It is good to hope for a great deliverance… However, there are certain small, easy and step-by-step paths to deliverance, and to reach the next one without achieving these would be contrary to the Sunnatullah *(the order established by Allah).*

Yes!… Let us await a universal and true saviour!…

But in accordance with the miraculous statement **in the Noble Qur'an**, ***'Li külli kavmin Had'*** *(Every people has its own* SAVİOUR*)*, why should we not look with hope towards local and national saviours, and towards institutions relating to language, education, the economy and morality?

We have seen with our own eyes how Christian nations have attained a prosperous future. They began by nationalising their languages.

The independence of the language is the first step towards national independence. A nation that loves its national language and begins to build its national literature upon that language has, in effect, received the promise of salvation.

After language comes **'history**'. When a nation, by accessing the oldest sources of its history, hears of the first developmental leaps in its national life , it rediscovers the spirit it had lost .

Guided by the light drawn from history, it weaves together the myths *(fairy tales)*, legends *(stories)* and narratives drawn from the depths of the people's collective memory to fully shape the **national** spirit. It is then that literature and the fine arts acquire their distinct character, drawing their themes and literary devices—such as **metaphor** (34) and **allusion** (35)—entirely from these sources.

Following these come religion, education and the economy. A free national education system is first and foremost committed to the national language and national history, and secondly to the principles of economic independence. And it draws all its spiritual light from religion.

The Naqshbandis hold an important belief, which is encapsulated in the following saying:

"Nazar ber kadem…"(36)

If a man's *rank* is that of a private, *HİS AMBİTİON* should be to become a general.

A private should strive to become a corporal; in other words, he should remain close to his rank.

We are still turning a blind eye to the fighting and looting taking place amongst the tribes of our own faith within our country.

It is very strange to think that the **'Islamic** Union' will come about simply by wishing for it. The Islamic faith has condemned and prohibited the display of racism and racial discrimination as '*ignorance*'.

However, the racial affinity and favouritism referred to here is tribal nationalism, which continues to persist amongst us.

The terms *'Bani Kahtan'* and *'Bani Adnan'* are also evidence that these condemnations and prohibitions pertain to tribes.

Just as the religion of Islam permits tribalism in the Noble Verse mentioned above, it has also deemed it appropriate, in the following Noble Verse, for people to be divided into tribes and communities—that is, into tribes and nations—provided there is mutual acquaintance and understanding between them.

"We have created you into nations and tribes so that you may come to know one another…"

It may be possible for all Muslims to unite politically in the distant future. However, there is no doubt that this will remain impossible for a very long time.

That being the case, will Muslim nations, during this long period, be deprived of their national awakening, their national struggles and, consequently, their progress—or at the very least, of retaining their social independence?

We have stated that the weapon of nationalism can henceforth only be used in the interests of Muslims. For the idea of nationalism is a weapon used by an enslaved people solely to free themselves from that slavery and dependence. There are now no non-Muslim peoples remaining under the rule of Islamic governments. Despite this, most Muslim peoples today find themselves in a state of captivity and dependence upon non-Muslims *(the Turks under Russian and Chinese captivity).*

Among Muslim peoples, however, as there are no situations of subjugation or independence, ***'nationalist ideas'*** do not lead to disputes amongst Muslims.

On the contrary, as ***the 'idea of nationhood'*** grows stronger, the concept of ***'Islamic ummah'*** will, to that extent, become more deeply rooted, thereby nourishing and strengthening the existing culture.

- END -

34 **Istiare:** This essentially means 'borrowing'. In literature, it refers to the temporary use of the meaning of one word in place of another. It is an imperfect form of metaphor.

35 **Telmih:** The art of deliberately using one or more words or phrases to evoke a past event, a well-known figure, a famous work, a saying or an anecdote familiar to everyone. For further information on literary arts, see **the Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Literary Knowledge / Osman Nuri Ekiz**, Toker Publications, Istanbul.

36 ***"Nazar ber kadem.."***: An expression meaning that a person who has joined the Naqshbandi order must remain solely on the path of the order, without concerning themselves with their surroundings, so as not to stray into other ways of thinking or paths.

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